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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1996, under Chapter 205 of the 1996 Acts and Resolves, the Massachusetts Legislature
authorized the McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Massachusetts

Boston to "review and explore possible cost savings within the Central Artery/Third Harbor
Tunnel project" and to report its findings to the House and Senate Committees on Ways and
Means and the Joint Committee on Transportation. For this study, the Institute assembled an
interdisciplinary team from within its own ranks and outside, first, to examine the composition
and rationale for the project's estimated cost of $10.4+ billion and, second, to identify possible
cost savings within this budget. This report describes the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of this effort. Our major findings are summarized below:
1.

The sizeable

adjacent to
•

and build these seven miles of Interstate roadways
attributable to three major factors;

cost to design

Downtown Boston is

in

and

The extensive tunneling and complicated interchanges required to rebuild and extend
the express highway system through the center of an active and vibrant metropolitan
region. This has required the design and execution of 119 interlinked construction
contracts in eight different construction zones, each densely developed and heavily
used.

•

The need for the design and construction to not only make long term improvements to
the urban and natural environment mandated by law but also to take measures to
insure the on-going operations of the city during the construction process. This

is

reflected in 1500 separate mitigation agreements developed during the course of project

planning and design.
•

The time - over two decades - needed to undertake engineering and design work,
mitigation agreements and construction and the impact of inflation.

While there is no precise way to allocate the costs to these three factors, we estimate that about
30% to 35% of the cost can be attributed to the required tunneling and interchange
construction alone, about 25% to 30% to the measures needed to mitigate the impacts of the
construction and meet required environmental standards, and up to 40% to account for
inflation and cost escalation resulting from a 25 year design and construction period.
2.

Of the total budget, over two thirds has been either spent or committed. The engineering

design is virtually complete, and construction on

all

the major components

is

well underway.

Reductions in the scope of the project or major changes in mitigation agreements at this stage
would be difficult and would create many unacceptable consequences for the city and region.
3.

To achieve budget reductions in

McCormack Institute,

the scale of 2% to

University of Massachusetts Boston

4%,

that

is,

$250 to $450 million, the
1

project would have to rely principally on measures to avoid all delays and unanticipated
changes in planned scope for all remaining construction packages, plus good luck in
completing packages on the critical path on or ahead of schedule. Keeping all elements of the

project

on schedule

is critical

remarkably free of contractor

To

and containment. So far, the project has been
which has been key to maintaining the schedule.

to cost control
litigation

managing the complicated engineering design and difficult
construction process have been met by the C A/T project management team. However, there
4.

date, the challenges of

are already

ahead.

upward

downtown Boston move
and containment measures

cost pressures as the tunneling operations in

The continued

diligent application of the cost control

already in place will be required to keep the budget within existing targets. There are a whole

battery of such measures which require extensive cooperation
interest,"

among

all

the "parties at

not only the project management and the contractors, but the Legislature, other
and local communities as well. These measures fall into two major

state regulatory agencies,

areas:

now

•

In operating the construction program,

•

In downsizing and transferring functions from the

well underway.

management team of the

Joint

Venture contractor, who has carried the burden of managing the design and
construction process to date, to the permanent agencies responsible for the ultimate
operation of the system — the Massachusetts Highway Department and the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
5.

Most of

management of the contract bidding and
domain of the project management. However, there are

the key measures involve the

administration process within the

some measures which require
unnecessary costs (See Table

1).

legislative

action or interagency cooperation to avoid

These include:

•

Changes in the laws governing the bidding process, particularly exemptions from filed
sub-bid requirements, and experimenting with A-B bidding procedures.

•

Changes

in other legislatively

mandated requirements,

(use of police details, for

example).
•

from redundant environmental review requirements and assistance of other
and local agencies in dealing with soil and landfill issues.

Relief
state

The still unformulated changes in the program for federal government funding cf highway
construction are not likely to provide the same high level of federal participation in the C A/T
program as in the past This means higher levels of state resources may be needed to complete
the job. The passage of the transportation bond bill and the legislation creating the Metropolitan
Highway System were essential to keep the project on track. The current favorable environment
6.
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and the use of Grant Anticipation Notes should ease the burden of this
increase on overall state finances However, there is a need to address the policy issues involving
revenue generation — tolls, user fees, gas taxes, and others — as the CA/T system is put into
for state borrowing

.

operation.

There are a substantial number of benefits and beneficiaries that will result from the CA/T
However, there are two categories of beneficiaries who will benefit more than the rest.
These are:

7.

project.

The

•

direct users of the system, particularly the

users of 1-90

and

The owners of

•

1-93 links

property, particularly in the

waterfront industrial area,

downtown-bound and airport-bound

when completed.
downtown Boston and South Boston

who will have access to their land extensively enhanced at the

expense of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth must examine the ways through which these
their fair share to the on-going costs of the

the

8.

Commonwealth and its

beneficiaries can contribute

CA/T program, including the substantial debt service

agencies will incur.

As the CA/T program continues in its major construction

phase, there are two important

areas in which the Legislature can and should play a role:
•

Monitoring the changes in the cost and budget allocations to anticipate problems which

may

require legislative action in the future.

Addressing the issues of cost recovery, including user charges, returns on land value
enhancements, and others.

The following is a summary of the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations in the
six chapters which comprise the body of this report.

Chapter
•

1

— The history and evolution of CA/T costs

The

size

of the budget is dictated by two interrelated factors:

the region's interstate highway system by rebuilding

first,

and extending it in the heart of the

regional center and, second, to undertake the construction with

needs and concerns of affected parties
the natural environment.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston

—

the decision to finish

weight given to the
the business and residential communities and
full

.

The

increases over the initial estimates are

due

to scope changes essential to mitigate the

construction impacts, plus inflation and the escalation of estimated cost over two decades.

•

The controversies involving the most difficult program elements (Central Artery North
Area and the Fort Point Channel crossings) were costly in both money and time.

Chapter 2
•

•

•

--

The current budget

The budget of $10.4+

Finance Plan could, in fact, be closer to
$10.7 to $11.0 billion. The pressure on the budget is upward, in part as a result of
mitigation measures required to control noise and dust and to maintain traffic flow in
downtown Boston
billion estimated in the

Over 25% of the budget has been allocated to engineering design and management and
most of it is already spent No major redesign is possible without severe difficulty.

Most of the budget

allocated for actual construction will be committed

1998. Actual construction

•

•

•

is

proceeding on

all

by the end of

the key components of the program.

Close to half of the construction budget is allocated to two critical areas — the northern
section of the Artery and the 1-93 /I-90 Interchange. Both are complicated because of
the difficult engineering and mitigation challenges involved.

both permanent and temporary - are a major portion of the
budget and have been required to both obtain legal approvals and maintain public and
political support for the program.
Mitigation measures

-

At this stage of advancement, changes in project scope in order to reduce budgeted costs
are not possible without severe damage or delay to the program and its outcome. Many
would have the effect of dumping more traffic onto local streets in the areas through
which the project is being built

Chapter 3 - Cost containment/reduction in the construction process
•

At this stage, interactions between project management and the construction contractors
provide the major arena for cost savings. Keeping the construction program on schedule
is

•

the key.

The range of potential savings is narrow. The program needs strong management and
good luck to keep within a

•

2%

to

4%

reduction range.

There are measures identified by both contractors and management which can help
McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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to

contain and reduce costs. These are primarily in the area of contract administration —
bid policy, partnering policy, change order policy, the Value Engineering Change

Proposals

(VECP) program, and others.

There are also some legislative actions and interagency cooperative agreements which
can help - filed sub-bid relief, new bidding methods, environmental assistance, etc.
•

Appropriate

—

Chapter 4
•

•

•

legislative

committees need to maintain vigilance over the program.

Cost containment/reduction in project management

The costs to design and manage the project have been great — a function of the time and
engineering detail required to satisfy all the difficult program requirements.
As the construction process moves ahead, ways should be found to relieve the costs of
project management by reducing the staff now on the payroll of the Joint Venture.
There are two possible methods for achieving

this: first,

by switching some functions

to

the permanent agencies (Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and Massachusetts Highway

Department) as they become geared up to manage the metropolitan highway system; and
second, by reducing overlapping functions in the project

Chapter 5
•

--

Financing

management team.

CA/T

Changes in the federal funding formula for highway support and its uncertain future
may put pressure on the Commonwealth to come up with more financial support for the
CA/T project than was anticipated at the outset.
state transportation bond and Metropolitan Highway System legislation both
provide needed resources essential to completing the CA/T program. The current low
interest fiscal environment should help lessen the unfavorable impact of such large state
borrowing on the overall budget of the Commonwealth.

The

The advent of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) as the key operator of the
completed CA/T system offers opportunities for sound policies and programs to generate
user revenues. These will be needed to help repay the debt
The use of Grant Anticipations Notes (GANS)
or obligations deficit between 1998 and 2001.

will

help to bridge the period of cash flow

The new bond legislation permits project construction to move quickly and locks current
low interest rates into construction borrowing.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston

Chapter 6
•

—

When

Benefits

and

beneficiaries

completed, the project will produce

improved

traffic flow in the regional center,

many benefits for the region including
new environmental amenities, and new

opportunities for economic development.

•

•

However, some will receive benefits greater than most Two categories stand out: first,
the highway travelers heading to and through downtown Boston and Logan Airport;
second, the owners and users of property in downtown Boston and the industrial areas
of South Boston.

The issues of future public policy arising from the C A/T project should focus on how and
in what form these beneficiaries should help pay their fair share of the costs of the
program. There is time to work out the issues involved, which should be placed high on
the regional agenda.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston

Table

1.

-SUMMARY OF CA/T COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION MEASURES
INVOLVING CA/T
POLICIES

REQUIRING
LEGISLATIVE
SUPPORT

Expanding the

A-B bidding procedure

MANAGEMENT

REQUIRING
INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION

THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS
IN

Contract bidding
procedure

contractor bidding
Filed sub-bid exemption

pool

Bid acceptance policy

Contract administration

Partnering policy

Change order

policy

A "deductible" for
change orders

VECP policy
Environmental regulatory

Additional landfill sites
Relief from unneeded

assistance

reviews

Revised

soil quality

definitions

Other Measures

Wrap-around

Requirements for police

insurance program

details

Approving

vertical

construction plans and

specs

IN

PROJECT

MANAGEMENT
Duplication of functions

Community

Rationalization of CA/T

Transfer of
relations

activities

permanent functions

now carried

Non-essential functions

out by

Joint Venture to

MHD and MTA
Note:

Bold denotes measures of potential major impact on

monitoring.

McCormack Institute,
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related fiscal affairs,

interagency coordination

and community relations
within

EOTC

agencies.

future costs and/or requiring priority attention

and

AN EXPLORATION OF POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS FOR THE CENTRAL
ARTERY/TUNNEL PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
The John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Massachusetts Boston is an
institution whose primary mission is public service. Through public policy research, educational
programs, policy practice and the dissemination of knowledge, the Institute seeks to have a constructive
impact on policy formulation, problem solving and public discourse concerning urgent civic challenges
facing state and local government in the

New

England region.

In 1996, under Chapter 205 of the 1996 Acts and Resolves, the Massachusetts legislature authorized
the Institute to undertake a study *to review

and explore

possible cost savings within the Central

Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project" and report its findings to the House and Senate Committees
on Ways and Means and the Joint Committee on Transportation.

on analyzing costs of the project through the prism
Commonwealth, as the ultimate owner of
the project, in its size and scope, current status, and expected outcomes. Our team consisted of
experienced public policy analysts recruited from within the ranks of the Institute and outside. It included
experts on engineering and construction industry practices in the Commonwealth, but with no past or
In devising the scope of study, our focus has been

of good public policy

—

that

current involvement in the

With

this

is,

CA/T program.

focus and objective,

engineering designs.

to identify the interests of the

we

did not play the role of a

financial auditor or

an evaluator of the

We did not play the role of an in-depth evaluator of management practices as would

an outside management expert. Nor did

we

attempt to duplicate the legally mandated reviews of the

numerous federal and state agencies with continuing responsibly for project oversight. Our role, then,
has been that of a neutral broker.

The

review was the cost estimates contained

starting point for this

in the

Massachusetts Highway

Department Finance Plan for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, dated September 30, 1996, which
estimated the overall cost of the project at $10.4+ billion when completed. $4.9 billion has been
spent as of June 30, 1996.
Needed

Already Spent to 6/30/96
Construction

$4.8 billion

Management

$0,505 billion

$0.8 billion

Engineering Design

$0,179

$0.4 billion

(8%)

Right of Way

$ 0.45 billion

$2.4 billion
$1.3 billion

Engineering Design
Right of Way

McCormack Institute,

Complete

(49%)
(27%)
(16%)

Construction

Management

Totals

to

$4.9 billion

(100%)

University of Massachusetts Boston

Totals

billion

$5.5 billion

(87%)
(9%)
(3%)
(1%)
(100%)

Our first major task was to determine the basis for these project costs by reviewing the elements that
make up this sum. These elements include the complicated construction required for the extensive
tunneling and intersection design, the long term and short term mitigation measures needed, the
relocation of utilities, the scheduling of the various program elements, the

management costs associated

with an extensive and lengthy design and construction process, and the benefits associated with each.

Our next

was

task

to

examine the question of whether any costs could be reduced or eliminated and

we reviewed four principal areas in which
there is significant budget allocated for project completion or important implications for how the project
what the impacts of such actions would

can be completed. The four areas

be.

For

this analysis,

are:

•

Proposals for potential scope reductions

•

The construction process, to identify possible cost saving and containment measures
Possible savings in program management costs
The funding status of the project

•
•

To undertake

(

as identified in the Finance Plan)

these reviews, the study team examined the extensive documentation generated in the

course of the program by project management, oversight agencies, the press, and others. This

documentation included the monthly management reports prepared by project management to track
progress on

all

phases of the program.

seminars, and conferences

where

We

also attended a

number of legislative

hearings, meetings,

issues related to the project have been discussed and debated. In

we interviewed scores of people who have played an important role in formulating or carrying
the project, including both those supportive and those critical. Among those interviewed were the

addition,

out

project

management

Administration

(MHD),

staff,

former

officials

of state transportation agencies, Federal Highway

(FHWA), Government Accounting Office (GAO), Massachusetts Highway Department

the Massachusetts Department of Finance and Administration, the Inspector General's staff

and other agency

staff;

engineers, construction contractors and other consultants associated with the

representatives of

project,

confidentiality
attitudes to

community and environmental groups, and

and candor of these contacts,

any of those interviewed.

we have made no

respect the

and recommendations of the study team.

report summarizes the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this review.

results are contained in six chapters

and an appendix containing cost information on the project:

- The history and evolution of CA/T costs
Chapter 2 - The current budget
Chapter 3 — Cost containment/reduction in the construction process
Chapter 4 — Cost containment/reduction in project management
Chapter 5 - Financing
Chapter 6 — The benefits and beneficiaries
Chapter

To

We have listened carefully to a variety of views and opinions, but

this report reflects exclusively the findings, conclusions,

The following

others.

attempt to attribute specific remarks and

1
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The

CHAPTER
To

1

AND EVOLUTION OF CA/T COSTS

- THE HISTORY

understand the basis for the costs of the Central Artery/Tunnel project, one must

first

understand

three important aspects of the undertaking: the physical and environmental setting of the project, the

decision- making process that led to

its

parameters, and the expected product and results of the

investment.

The physical and environmental
The

setting

project involves the building of

two major express highway

links in the center

of the Boston

an extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike (Interstate Route 90) across
Boston Harbor to Logan International Airport and, second, the rebuilding in an underground tunnel
metropolitan region,

first

system of the existing elevated Central Artery (Interstate Route 93) which runs north and south through

Downtown

Boston.

To

of the

a large extent, these two highway links augment a system of hub and spoke

World War n and designed to provide major highway capacity in the center
region and relieve the older urban arteries that became overburdened with the growth of post-war

expressways conceived

after

traffic.

The urban environment
for any

in

which

governmental, financial,

this

construction

is

taking place, however,

is

one of the most

difficult

Downtown Boston is a densely packed business,
cultural and tourism center. As the locus for over 300,000 jobs, it is the largest

highway system

built in the nation.

economic center in New England. This historic center is surrounded by water - Boston Harbor and the
numerous rivers feeding into it. Across the Harbor on an isolated peninsula is the New England region's
major airport, which has emerged as one of the important pieces of infrastructure supporting the great
high tech, financial, health and educational enterprises that characterize the region's modern economy.

Both the land and water environments

in

and around the regional center are

sensitive,

and major

made to preserve both. The neighborhoods surrounding downtown
many of the nation's most important educational and

investments have been and are being

Boston are active places providing the sites for

cultural institutions, along with highly prized housing resources for a diverse
in contrast to

urban population. This

is

many American cities where the abandonment of neighborhoods adjacent to central
made it relatively easy to build express highways around the downtown perimeter.

business districts

Boston's physical and environmental structure has forced the planning for transportation improvements
in the region into a uniquely limited

In the period after

World War n,

highways which called for eight
circumferential expressways —

an inner belt to be

1

built

This plan was

and reaffirmed

in

Highway system,

McCormack Institute,

the region's planning authorities developed a long range plan for

radial

expressways to center on downtown Boston, along with three

an outer belt (now route 495), a middle belt (now route 128 -1-95) and

through the densely packed communities close to downtown.

first

1

In the late 1950s

proposed in 1948 and adopted by the State Department of Public Works (now

subsequent plans.
first

framework.

proposed

Some but not all

in 1944,

but lacked funding until the passage of the Interstate

University of Massachusetts Boston

MHD)

of these roads were to be part of the Federal Interstate

Highway and
10

1-95

Rte. 3

1-95

1-95

Rte.

1-93

Rte.2

Rte.

Rte. 2

%
•

Extension

i-95

• «•

^i*xg£
1-90

Inner *
Belt

*«.

**

Southwest Expressway

1-95
a

f

Figure

1

Regional Expressway System
Regional Expressways
Interstate

Highways

Central Artery/ Third

Harbor Tunnel

*••

Expressways dropped
In 1970's

1-95
Rte. 24

1

I

and 1960s when the federal government's Interstate Highway program held out the promise for major
help to states and metropolitan regions in funding their plans for new highway infrastructure, the Boston
region's response

Figure

1).

The

was to

initial

start to build its

planned circumferential and radial expressways (regional map,

projects included upgrading

Route 128 and building a new outer circumferential

(Route 1-495) to provide for traffic movement around the region and construction of some of the eight
radial

expressways to center on

expressways were

built,

downtown Boston.

In the 1950's and 1960's three of these radial

along with the Central Artery: the Southeast Expressway (Route 3 south)

,

the

first to Route 128 in the 1950's then its extension from 128 to downtown in the
and 1-93 North, along with the rebuilding of Route 2 from Route 128 to Alewife. One of the

Mass. Turnpike (1-90)
1960's
radials,

,

Route 3 north, was

built

as a result of mounting pressure

only to Route 128, with

its

extension to

downtown Boston dropped

from the affected communities. The amount of housing and parkland

takings and community disruption required to complete the radials from Route 128 towards downtown
were causing substantial protests from the impacted communities. In addition, the plan to build a third
tunnel across Boston Harbor from downtown to Logan Airport was also running into opposition from

affected neighborhood groups in East Boston.

By

underway to complete the system, the new Southwest Expressway (I-95S) was
major railroad connecting Boston to the south and plans were in the works
for a new Northeast Expressway (I-95N) generally paralleling Route 1 North, along with the extension
of the Route 2 expressway, which had been built from Route 128 to Alewife. All these radials would
be connected near the center of the region by the Inner Belt Expressway (1-695), traversing the old
established community of Somerville, bisecting the City of Cambridge, crossing the Charles River in the
vicinity of Boston University and the Back Bay hospital complexes and the northern sections of
Roxbury, and connecting to the Southeast Expressway near the South End. As plans for these major
additions came closer to implementation, the affected communities began to object more strongly and
question the value of the whole expressway scheme.
to

1970, plans were

be

The

still

built adjacent to the

decision

making process

In the early 1970's, in response to mounting

community pressure, a moratorium on new express highway

construction inside Route 128 was declared by then-Governor Sargent. The landmark Boston
Transportation Planning Review was initiated to review

all

the plans and examine the options for each

of the radial highway corridors, including improved public transportation.
decision

was made by the Sargent administration not

to

By the end of this review, the

complete the original plan for the three

additional interstate standard expressways to be interconnected by the inner belt highway. This set in

motion a whole new strategy for improving the regional transportation system.

First,

it

was decided

to

put the immediate priority for regional transportation improvements on rebuilding and expanding the
existing rapid transit

system

in the corridors

previously considered for the expressways, including

extensions to the system to intersect the highway network at strategic points (Alewife and Braintree).

was further decided to revive and improve the region's substandard commuter rail services, which had
deteriorated extensively under private ownership. This program of transit improvements was the focus
It

Defense Act of 1956 which created the Highway Trust Fund
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to

be financed through federal gas taxes.
\\

for construction activities through the remainder of the decade.

federal funds available for Interstate

provisions of federal law.

To

build these transit improvements,

highway construction were "traded

in" as provided

under revised

2

Second, to meet the state's opportunity and obligation to complete the planned federal Interstate
highway system in the region, it was decided to interconnect Interstate 95 through the region by routing

Route 128 around Boston and adjacent communities to the West, instead of building
Interstate 95 on new expressways in the Southwest corridor and in the Route 1 -North Shore corridor
as a radial connection. This left two major highway system improvements within route 128 on the
it

on the

existing

regional agenda; the

first

was

a third harbor tunnel to the Airport and the second

the elevated portions of the Central Artery

connecting

its

below grade,

to

was

the rebuilding of

complete the 1-93 radial system by

northern section with the Southeast Expressway through downtown. Since the inner belt

had been eliminated, the Artery corridor was the only route available to handle the growing
volumes of traffic moving through the center of the region. The elevated structure was becoming
obsolete and was an eyesore. Rebuilding it underground would not require the kind of land
taking that the inner belt would have involved.
For the

rest

of the decade of the 1970's,

improvements were the prime focus for investments in
Various succeeding administrations favored either the Artery

transit

the region's transportation infrastructure.

3

These two concepts for highway
improvements remained on the table, but there was no consensus on whether to proceed. Finally, in
1983, during the second Dukakis administration, it was decided to combine the two projects into a single
or the Third Harbor Tunnel project as the next highway priority.

program. This would involve depressing and widening the Central Artery, building the

new

tunnel to Logan Airport in a new alignment completely on airport property on the eastern end,
and connecting the two through the South Boston waterfront on a new seaport access road. The
plan

would provide much needed improvement

north shore but with

would

much less

for traffic headed to the airport

from the West and the

disruption to the East Boston neighborhood than the earlier scheme.

further provide badly needed

highway capacity

to

move

traffic to

It

and through downtown.

The improvements were eligible for funding under the federal interstate construction program, which
would cover 90% of eligible project costs. The tunnel and access road were the logical extension of
Interstate 90 from the end of the Massachusetts Turnpike at the intersection of the Southeast
expressway to the airport and north. The Central Artery reconstruction would link the two sections of
Interstate 93.

2

4

Massachusetts policy makers were a major part of the coalition lobbying Congress for these revisions in the use of Interstate Highway funds.
3

For a complete discussion of the history and controversies involved in the creation of the Central Artery/Tunnel

project, see

PROJECT A Political

History of Boston's Multi billion Dollar Artery/Tunnel Project, by David Luberoff and Alan Altshuler

--

published by the Alfred

Taubman Center for

University.

-

4

State and Local

Government - John

F.

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

There were extensive controversies between the State and Federal administrations about the merits of the new scheme and

eligibility for federal

funding under the Interstate program. While the 1-90 extension to the airport was considered justified, the

93 Central Artery depression was considered by some to be more of an urban beautification than a highway project. The

University of Massachusetts Boston

its

more expensive

state officials

compromise under which most, but not all, of the artery costs would be covered by the Interstate program. This policy was adopted
surface transportation act which became the basis for project funding. (See Luberoff and Altshuler - Chapter III)
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1987

The

widen the Artery and to extend the Turnpike across the Fort Point Channel
to connect to the new tunnel required extensive tunneling in difficult, fully developed urban terrain.
The tunneling, moreover, could not disrupt the businesses and residential neighborhoods of downtown
Boston during what would be a long and difficult construction process. Achieving these goals would
decision to depress and

require delicate and sensitive construction methods which would be costly.

With the

federal funding in place, the state turned to the detailed planning needed to secure the

environmental and other permits required by both state and federal law. During this process, community

and environmental interests had to be
also that

it

satisfied,

not only that the project would not harm interests but

would advance them. The downtown business community had

to be assured that the city

could continue to function during construction and that the project would be a positive contribution to

when completed. Throughout this process, state officials studied
By 1991, when the Weld administration took office, the
process for receiving formal approvals from both the Federal Highway Administration and state
environmental regulators was well advanced.
both

traffic

flow and urban amenities

dozens of solutions to pressing problems.

Through this decision making process, the fundamental commitments to build and fund the project were
agreed to by Massachusetts policy makers over the last three decades, and endorsed by subsequent
administrations, legislatures, and the federal government.

The expected

results

As a result of this series of decisions made over an extended period and participated in by state,
federal

government

officials

city

and

with the participation of the local business, environmental and residential

communities, the Central Artery/Tunnel project came to resemble not just the traditional urban
highway construction project but something much more. Through the use of the highway
construction process, major improvements would be made to the whole urban environment of
the region's center. The Central Artery, one of the nation's most congested highways carrying over
190,000 vehicles a day on a structure designed for 90,000, would be rebuilt and depressed. When

expanded and put underground the rebuilt highway would not only improve traffic access to and through
downtown Boston but would open up the surface to extensive environmental improvements, particularly
in the historic North End neighborhood and in adjacent valuable waterfront locations. Connecting the

Mass Turnpike

directly to

Logan Airport would not only

greatly improve the transport access to this

key regional facility but also provide access to a large area of under- developed urban land sandwiched
between downtown and the airport along the South Boston waterfront. These enhancements would help
additional development and improvement of both of these areas.

When one

examines the scope and nature of

characteristics of conventional urban

major urban surgery

--

this

scheme, one finds that

highway construction.

It

it

goes

far

appears to have more in

beyond the

common

with

the equivalent of an arterial bypass operation applied to a functioning urban

patient, requiring the skill

and

sensitivity akin to that

of a highly competent medical team, in addition to

highly creative highway design, engineering, and construction. This surgery would be performed in front

of a very large audience of oversight agencies, government
McCormack Institute,
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community groups,

the press and the general public. This has provided the basis for the costs of the

entire program, currently estimated to be

The

$10.4+

billion, to

complete the surgery successfully.

evolution of project costs

While the detailed planning, environmental reviews and negotiations with interest groups in the period
from 1985 to 1993 were necessary to move the project through the rigorous permitting process while
maintaining political and

community support, they
Table 1.1

-

also drove

up the

total costs.

History of Project Cost Estimates
(in millions)

Year

Estimate

1985

2,564.0

1987
1989

3,185.0
4,436.0
5,193.0
6,443.0
7,740.0
7,740.0

1991
1992
1993
1995

Exclusions
-

998.0

Total

1996

Changes

Inflation

-

Projected Cost

-

565.0
462.0
458.0
641.0
428.0
1387.0
3,941.0

46.0
799.0
299.0
609.0
869.0
259.0
2,881.0

10,400.0

3,175.0
4,446.0
5,193.0
6,443.0
7,740.0
10,384.0

10,400.0

Before the detailed planning and engineering began on the project
the cost to be $ 2,564 billion. This

2,564.0

was

the figure used by

in

1985, the early studies estimated

Massachusetts

officials responsible for

was expected
was based on estimated

developing the project to obtain the required backing of the federal government, which

most of the costs through the Interstate Highway Program. The figure
1982 construction prices and did not include the cost of inflation. Once the project had received the
approval to move ahead and the environmental and design studies begun, its scope began to take its full
shape, with the active participation of the variety of community and environmental interest groups with
important stakes in the outcome. In this phase, a variety of critical issues emerged involving not only the
design of the highway segments and their method of construction but also the impact of the construction
on the affected communities and on the overall environment.
to fund

In this period, there were also fundamental issues raised about the cost of the project and

its

impact on

highway
Commonwealth. These issues, ranging from the very detailed to those
involving fundamental development policy, had to be worked out in order for the project to move ahead.
By 1988, when the preliminary detailed engineering design was begun, a number of serious issues
the allocation of transportation funding resources, including public transit improvements and

projects in other areas of the

involving not only the design, engineering, and construction, but also the allocation of transportation

resources were

on the agenda of the policy makers with unresolved controversies still in the wind.
was well underway and the construction process had begun, the
cost was estimated at $7.74 billion. In 1996, after most of the final engineering designs had been
completed, along with about one quarter of the construction (principally the Ted Williams Tunnel) the
total cost was estimated at $10.4 billion, with $4.9 billion having been spent and $5.5 billion needed to
complete the program by 2005.

By

still

1992, after the engineering design

,
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There are four main reasons for this escalation in estimated cost over this almost 15-year period
of design, engineering and conflict resolution.

The first is the expansion of basic scope over time;

the changes needed to resolve
fundamental conflicts in the design and to meet required transportation and environmental
standards and agreed upon mitigation measures; and fourth, the effects of inflation. This cost

second, the extension of the schedule of completion; third,

evolution

The

is

described in Table 1-1.

increases in the scope of the project

beyond the

initial

plan included:

Between 1985 and 1989:
•

construction of the haul road through South Boston.

•

extension of the southerly portion of the project from the South

Bay

to the Mass.

Avenue

interchange.
•

addition of high occupancy vehicle

•

addition of a

new

(HOV)

lanes to the 1-90 segments of the project.

intersection connecting the airport interchange to

Route

1

A in East Boston.

Between 1989 and 1991:

Dewey Square.

•

reconstruction of the northbound tunnel under

•

addition of tunnel covers over 1-90 in South Boston.

•

adoption of "scheme Z" for the Charles River crossing and the addition of the tunnel connectors to
the project under City Square in Charlestown.

Between 1991 and 1992:
•

addition of a

number of public

Artery and South

transit

Bay interchange

improvements and

utility

relocation projects to the Central

areas.

•

redesign of the Tunnel under the Fort Point Channel

•

taking of additional land required as a result of court judgments.

•

redesign of the Charles River crossing plans, scrapping "scheme Z".

These scope additions and changes were the

result

of extensive bargaining and negotiation between the

project designers and the affected "parties at interest," including community, business and environmental

groups, the Federal

Highway Administration, and a

difficult issues to resolve.

It

variety of state agencies, with sometimes very

5

should be pointed out that probably the most serious problems affecting both the engineering design

and the overall project schedule and related costs were the disputes over the best plan for the Charles
River crossing and the best system to cross under the Fort Point Channel, two of the more complicated
design and construction elements in the entire scheme. Resolution of these major issues delayed the

completion of final designs and slowed the potential to meet the original project construction schedule,

See Luberoff and Alishuler, op. at.
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increasing the time and the cost of both the design and project

these issues were resolved, the estimated time to complete the
the Issues

were

completion of

settled

all

enough

management budgets. In 1991, before
entire project was 1998. By 1993, when

to let final design and construction proceed, the estimated time for final

construction slipped to 2004.

6

should also be pointed out that the "funding environment" under which the planning, design, and
was being conducted anticipated that the financial resources of
the Interstate Construction Program could be used in most aspects of the project. Thus the emphasis
It

engineering of this complicated project

was put on insuring

that the

program could pass environmental muster and that there was no
program in the courts. Cost containment was

basis for the environmental critics to challenge the
not the focus of attention during this period.

However, with the passage of Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 199 1 which
provided increased funding for states to complete their interstate highway projects to reflect the effects
of inflation, there was an important change in federal policy. The commitment to pay the
"costs-to-complete" of unfinished Interstate project was ended. The last official estimates of costs were
used to determine the total amount of Interstate Construction Fund financing that eligible projects would
receive. Any costs over and above these last official estimates would be funded on a different basis than
had been used in the past (The implications of this change on the CA/T project are discussed in Chapter
,

5).

As

number of other related construction elements were
These were projects being constructed by other transportation agencies,
including MBTA and Massport, within the boundaries of the CA/T project and being managed as part
of the CA/T construction program. These "third party" costs are included in the overall budget of
$10.4+ billion, categorized as "support" or "exclusions" from federally funded elements in budget
a result of the extension of the project scope, a

added

to the

CA/T

project

.

descriptions.

Finally, in hindsight,

it is

possible to see

what the impact of the

inflationary pressures of more than a

decade of design and construction of the Central Artery/Tunnel project has been on the cost of all he
The provision for inflation for the period from 1985 to 2004 is estimated to account
for close to $4.0 billion of the increase over the 1985 estimates. This is the equivalent of about 40%
of the estimated cost of the entire program.
project elements.

At the present time, the project is essentially fully designed and engineered, with the exception of
planning the use of land area reclaimed in downtown Boston after the current Central Artery viaduct
is dismantled and the tunneling system is completed. Construction is approaching 30% completion and,
by the end of 1997, virtually all the major construction contracts will have been let. With the design and
engineering controversies resolved for the most part, the project should be able to

move ahead on

schedule, barring any major occurrence of litigation or other unforeseen circumstance producing delay.

These completion dates were included

McCormack Institute,
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Table 1.2-

SUMMARY OF CA/T COST HISTORY
COST

COMMENT

$ 2.564 B.

This was the first estimate of total cost
for the core components of the Artery

DATE/CATEGORY
1983-85

-ORIGINAL ESTIMATE

Preliminary engineering —the basis for

and Tunnel based on early conceptual

Federal approvals

designs and engineering

BASIC SCOPE ADDITIONS
FOR TRAFFIC FLOW
IMPROVEMENT

CHARLES RIVER
CROSSING

$ 508 M.

Crossings redesigned to handle traffic
so as to alleviate community concerns

and improve riverfront conditions
FHWA et. al. proposed to bring

HOV T A NFS

$ 262

-

M.

project

up

to

modem highway

standards

Rebuilding of
1-93 South extension-'-$ 130
Rte.

SPECIFIC COMMUNITY AND
ENVIRONMENT
IMPROVEMENTS

M.

SE expressway

viaduct

Mass. Ave.
Revised plan
to

1A interchange -($18.0 M)
176 M.

S. Bos.

Tunnel Covers--

S. Bos.

ROW additions- $ 173 M.

-$

To protect community from traffic
noise

To provide

better traffic

flow and

property access
S. Bos.

By-pass Road

—

$

23 M.

Haul road for trucks

to mitigate

effects of construction activity

OTHER PREPARATION AND
ENVBRONMENTAL MITIGATION

Hazardous waste disposal program
$ 141
Utility relocation

NON- CONSTRUCTION

Required by State and Federal law

M.
$

B/PB Contract add on

--$

85 M.

263 M.

Required to tunnel under built up
sections of the city
Adjusted for additional scope

OVERHEAD
$ 237

Insurance

M.

To

save cost in construction bids

Detailed mitigation measures resulting

$642M.

Other
1993

REVISED ESTIMATE

SCOPE CHANGES
+ 1985 ESTIMATE

—

+ INFLATION
1993- 1995

CHANGES

=TOTAL
SUPPORT COSTS

1996

REVISED ESTIMATE

93-96

CHANGES

+1993

ESTIMATE

=

McCormack Institute,
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—

-

final design solutions

$2,622 B.
$2,564 B.
$2,554 B.
$ 7.740 B.

$ 998 M.

DESIGN CHANGES
INFLATION

from

Other project costs not using Federal
highway funds

$ 259 M.

$1,387 B.

—

Inflation to

end of project -2004

$2,644 B.

These costs are the basis for the 1996

$7,740 B.

Financial plan

$10,384 B.
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CHAPTER 2

--

THE CURRENT BUDGET

Understanding the current budget of the Central Artery/Tunnel Project is preliminary to an examination
of the potential for cost reduction. In

of the budget. Second,

we

we

this chapter, therefore,

we

review

first

the structure and status

analyze the budget allocation by program area for mitigation, and, finally

review the scope changes and their implications.

Part

STRUCTURE AND STATUS

1.

To determine what is included in the budget and its status, we have examined the management reports
which the CA/T project staff produces every month to track all aspects of project costs, including
changes

in allocations to various categories

due to

shifts

and changes

orders and reallocations of budget items. Table 2. 1 shows the

in construction bids,

change

way the overall budget is reported and

summarized. The first column is the current budget with costs of all project components "unescaiated"

— that is, not reflecting the effects of inflation during the period from now to the year 2004. The second
column shows the current budget with costs "escalated" by about 9% to reflect the anticipated inflation,
and the

third

column provides a forecast of potential costs

for all

components based on current trends

in project expenditures.

The budget

includes a "credit" for the recovery of air rights sales from the land

result of the depression

of the Artery. These are estimates of what the

be able to recover from the sale of these parcels
status of the real estate market in
to be a

decade

as

some future date,

downtown Boston

in the future, this figure

this credit, the current total

at

at the

made

available as a

MTA as project "owner" might

a situation that will depend on the

time of potential

sale.

can be considered as a speculative guess

Since this

at this time.

is likely

Without

budget (escalated) would be $10,991 billion rather than the $10,736

billion

shown below.

Table

2.1

(as of 1/31/97

- CA/T OVERALL COST
-

CA/T management report)

per

CURRENT BUDGET

CURRENT BUDGET

POTENTIAL

(UNESCALATED)

(ESCALATED)

(FORECAST)

$ 9.7S8 B.

$ 10.736 B.

$ 10.711 B.

(91%)

(100%)

(excludes air rights credit)

(includes air rights credit)

(includes air rights credit)

Note also that the current budget as of January 1997 is higher than the $10.4+ billion figure in
the Finance Plan, reflecting seven months of changes in construction estimates, bid experience,
and increases in other costs. As the project moves ahead into the period of maximum
construction, the monthly movement of the budget bears careful monitoring, particularly to
determine the causes of any upward or downward trend both in the overall budget and specific
components. While the federal and state oversight agencies watch these numbers carefully, we
recommend that the legislature also keep watch. This will be essential not only for tracking
CA/T progress but also for anticipating legislative action on funding and other measures.
Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of the overall budget by funding category
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the direct costs (close to

18

85%

of the total) are those which are eligible for and supported by federal highway funds, while the
remaining 1 59c are categorized as "support costs". These include the budget for those elements funded
primarily by state and local transportation agencies (third parties) but within the scope of the
project.

These agencies include the three transportation

(MP A),

the Massachusetts

authorities

CA/T

- the Massachusetts Port Authority

Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and

the Massachusetts Turnpike

Authority (MTA).

Table 2.2 --CA/T

OVERALL COSTS BY FUNDING CATEGORY
(Current Budget Escalated)

Supported by Federal highway
funds
Primarily State and local agency

funding

DIRECT
COSTS

$ 9.046 B.

SUPPORT
COSTS

$ 1.690 B.

TOTAL

$10,736 B.

(Includes credit of $255 m. for
sales of air rights)

(Includes third party costs of

$ 270 m.)

COSTS
Table 2.3 shows the overall budget broken

down by

function: 1) those associated with the design,

management of the project including insurance; and 2) those associated with actual
including the more than 1 19 separate construction packages plus the costs of acquiring

engineering and
construction,

rights of way, the relocation of utilities (force accounts),

the project area for the construction of the

and geotechnical services required

roadways and

intersections.

Note

that over

the budget has been allocated to design/engineering/management related costs
believe, of the complicated

—

to prepare

one quarter of

a reflection,

we

and time-consuming nature of the engineering required, including the

construction related and long term mitigation solutions which building in this dense urban environment

demanded. The preliminary design work was undertaken by the Bechtel/Parsons Brinkerhoff Joint

Venture and

is

included in their budget.

included in the section design budget.
construction
rather than

Final designs undertaken by other engineering firms are

The insurance budget includes

the cost of insuring the

work against accidents — a service which is being purchased centrally by the CA/T project

by individual construction contractors as a cost saving measure.

Table 2.3

-CA/T OVERALL COSTS BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY
~ Direct and Support Costs Combined)

(Current Budget Escalated

DESIGN/ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
COSTS

CONSTRUCTION RELATED COSTS

$ 2.933 B.

$7,803 B.

(27%)

(73%)

B/PB JOINT VENTURE - $ 1.632

SECTION DESIGNS

B.

(includes force account designs)

INSURANCE (MGT.

$

.

801

—

CONSTRUCTION
PACKAGES
B. — RIGHT OF WAY
UTILITY RELOCATION

$ 7.257 B.

$ 1.028 B.

RES.) -$ 0.273 B.

(Force accounts)

( $.

255

B

)

—

GEOTECH
Air rights credit

Table 2.4 shows the amount of the overall budget committed as of the end of January, 1997. Close
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to

$7.0

over

billion,

65%

of the entire cost of the project, has already been allocated

project activities, including both design and

management

to various

functions and construction contracts.

Over 60% of the direct construction budget and over three-fourths of other project costs have been
committed, reflecting the status of a project virtually all engineered and well underway in the
construction program. (Note that according to the February, 1997 Management Report, the
committed amount had reached $ 7.294 billion, and in the March Report, $ 7.697 billion).

Table 2.4

CA/T OVERALL COSTS

COMMITTED

(as of 1/31/97)

Total

=$

6.936 B. (65%)

OTHER PROJECT COSTS

DIRECT CONSTRUCTION

$ 2.219 B. (76%)

$ 4.717 B. (60%)

Table 2.5 shows the amount of uncommitted current (escalated) budget along with the potential
forecast as of the

end of January, 1997. The expected "to go" costs represent just over one

third of

the overall budget.

-CA/T UNCOMMITTED BUDGET
(TO GO COSTS - as of 1/31/97)

Table 2.5

DIRECT AND SUPPORT COSTS COMBINED

CURRENT BUDGET
(ESCALATED)

TOTAL

POTENTIAL FOR]

1

$ 10.736 B.

$ 10.711 B.

COMMITTED (1/31/97)

$ 6.936 B.

$ 6.936 B.

UNCOMMITTED

$ 3.800 B.

$ 3.775 B.

1

.

Includes credit for sales of air rights.

Table 2.6 shows the allocation of uncommitted costs by function:
accounts for over

87%

1) for

construction which

of the remaining budget to be committed; and 2) other project costs, of

which the cost of the Joint Venture

is

the major item.

It is

expected that

much more of

the

remaining uncommitted portions of the construction budget will be allocated to construction
contractors by the end of 1997.
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Table 2.6 -CA/T

UNCOMMITTED BUDGET ("TO GO" COSTS)

-

BY CATEGORY

(as of 1/31/97)

DIRECT AND SUPPORT COSTS COMBINED

BUDGET (ESCALATED)

FORECAST

CONSTRUCTION
PACKAGES

$ 3.184 B.

$ 3.384 B.

FORCE ACCOUNTS

$

113 M.

$

44 M.

CONSTRUCTION

RIGHT OF

WAY

Air rights sales

($255 M.)

$124M.
$ 102
($

M.

255 M.)

Geotech

CONSTRUCTION
TOTAL

$ 3.086 B.

$ 3.355 B.

$ 638 M.

$ 638 M.

$192 M.

$ 172 M.

OTHER COSTS
B/PB

MANAGEMENT

DESIGN CONTRACTS
(Includes section and
force accounts 3rd party)

INSURANCE

($ 241

MANAGEMENT

M.)

($390 M.)

$125M.

RESERVE

OTHER TOTAL

This picture of the budget and

$ 714

M.

$ 420 M.

which is substantially into the
construction phase, providing little, if any, opportunity to undertake changes in the scope,
planning, design, engineering, or other aspects of the project, including changes in the agreed
upon mitigation measures which have been built into various construction contracts. To a great
extent, the future of the project lies in the hands of the construction contractors who have been
given a go-ahead to build the various project elements as designed. Their ability to perform
within their contracted budgets and meet all the commitments agreed to will be the key to
its

allocation reflects a project

completing the project within this budget.
Part

2.

BUDGET ALLOCATION BY PROGRAM AREA

The $10.4+ billion is allocated to 119 contracts covering engineering, design and construction
management spread out over some 7.5 linear miles of area in downtown Boston and adjacent
communities. In the Management Reports, the budget is allocated to three major segments: the 1-90
packages ( the segments connecting Mass Pike to the Airport through East Boston and the Ted Williams
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Tunnel), the 1-93 packages (the segments including the Central Artery and

connections to 1-93 North

its

and the Southeast Expressway), and the system- wide packages. For convenience in examining costs and
the consequence of possible reductions, the project has been broken
five
2,

down into eight major components,

of which comprise the core elements, and three of which are essential connections; (See Figure

Cost Allocation Map.)

The Core Elements include:
1.

The Artery-Central ~

Boston where the

Causeway

area between

this is the

existing Artery (six lanes)

is

Street and High Street in

elevated on a structure which

a traffic point of view and structurally obsolete.

The

is

downtown

both substandard from

existing elevated structure

is

a barrier restricting

the flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic between such important attractions of downtown

the Faneuil Hall Market Place, and the

Boston as

New England Aquarium, the North End, Rowes Wharf, and other

waterfront areas. These are the key attractions for

many

if

not most of Boston's visiting tourists and

Both the Market Place and the Aquarium are among the most important
neighborhood of 3.0 million visitors a year. The plan is to
put this section of the Artery underground in a tunnel system that would have connections to the Sumner
residents seeking entertainment.

attractions in the region, each drawing in the

MBTA and

and Callahan Tunnels without disturbing the operation of the Blue Line of the

provide

surface circulation and protection against noise, dust, and other nuisances to the abutting residents and

commercial establishments during the lengthy construction process. The program

calls first for the

enough to support the existing
Then a "bridge" will be built at the surface to carry the existing roadways. Under this "bridge"

construction of "slurry walls' on either side of the existing Artery strong
structure.

a large trench up to 150 feet deep will be excavated, after

which the roadway tunnels

will be placed.

artery structure will be removed. In

park land and

sites for

its

all

the utility lines have been relocated, into

When this is done, the trench will be filled in and the existing

place will be an attractive pedestrian-friendly urban boulevard,

new downtown-related development. The

extensive tunneling for this section

number of expensive

of the Artery, along with

all

buildings be constructed.

The actual cost of construction of this component, for which the engineering

designs are complete,

is

the other tunnel sections, requires that a

estimated at $1.5 billion, and the total project cost including

way, engineering and share of management and insurance costs

2.

The Artery-South —

this is the area

is

$2.1 billion, or

ventilation

utilities, right

20%

of the

total.

between High Street and Kneeland Street where the

Massachusetts Turnpike (1-90) currently ends and where the existing Artery runs through the

Square-South Station Tunnel before emerging on the elevated structure
realign and

of

expand the existing tunnel to carry southbound

traffic

at

High

Street.

Dewey

The plan

is

to

and to build a new tunnel under

Avenue adjacent to South Station to carry northbound traffic. The construction of the new
tunnel will be deep enough to permit the MBTA's Red Line to operate without interruption and will also
Atlantic

provide the right-of-way for the

new South Boston

Transitway, a light

the South Station area with the fast developing commercial areas
waterfront.

As with

system which will connect

the central section, slurry walls will be constructed and

supported by a "bridge" to allow excavation of the trench into which the

be placed under Atlantic Avenue.

McCormack Institute,
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on the South Boston

The

actual construction cost for
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this

existing

industrial

roadways

north bound roadway will

segment,

now underway,
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is

$ 516 million, and
the total to

3.

The

its

share of

utility relocation,

$826 million or 7.9% of the

I-90/I-93 interchange at

right-of-way, engineering and

management costs

bring

project total.

South Bay

-- this is

the

key intersection on the

CA/T

system, for

it

traffic moving on 1-93 to interchange
moving on 1-90 (the Mass Pike) and connecting through the Ted Williams
tunnel to Logan Airport. The interchange will make it possible for people and goods coming from the
south and west of downtown Boston — the location of well over half the population and businesses of
is

designed to provide the interchange that will allow North-South

with the East-West

traffic

the metropolitan region
to the airport

The plan

is

-

to by-pass the Central Artery

and the Sumner and Callahan tunnels

in travel

and the North shore. Without this interchange, the CA/T traffic scheme will not work.

very complicated, for

it

requires a series of tunnels, viaducts and entrance and exit ramps

operating at five different levels. This requires tunneling under the Fort Point Channel, the South Station
railroad facilities

MBTA's Red Line,

and

sensitive environment.

It is

one of the most

traversing an area of very
difficult

poor

soil conditions,

and a highly

engineering design problems anywhere on the U.S.

Highway system. The plan required very intricate alignment design to avoid creating problems
Company, home to one of the region's most important industries, and to provide safe
and sensitive access to the Chinatown community, one of the treasures of downtown Boston. As a
Interstate

for the Gillette

result, this intersection will

a

CA/T system,

be the single most costly construction of the entire

a set of interconnecting tunnels, viaducts and ramps crossing existing railroad

lines,

requiring

subway tunnels and

now underway, is estimated to cost $2.0 billion, with about 42%
utilities and 32% of all engineering design costs going into this piece

waterway. Actual construction,

of all costs to design and relocate
of the project. With

its

share of

interchange will be $3.1 billion,

management and other costs allocated, the total for the South Bay
or close to one third (29.6%) of the total CA/T project cost.

The South Boston tunneling and interchange — this piece of the project connects the South Bay
interchange with the Ted Williams Tunnel under Boston Harbor, through a series of cut and cover
4.

tunnels.

It

also includes the haul road through

to by-pass truck traffic

South Boston, which has been

around the South Boston residential community.

built

and

is in

operation

When completed, the planned

what has been a relatively inaccessible part of the industrial and
interchange, with new
commercial area of the South Boston peninsula sandwiched between downtown Boston and Logan
surface streets in

airport, will

be brought into a development mode offering important

possibilities for

new economic

development related to these key activity centers. This development process has already begun. Actual
construction cost for these parts of the system is $ 887 million. However, the right- of-

way acquisition

and the complicated designs required to connect with local streets and the South Boston Transitway

made

program. Total costs are estimated

5.

somewhat higher than for other segments of the
$1.23 billion or 11.8% of total project cost.

the allocation of these costs to the project

The Ted Williams Tunnel -

at

this

tunnel has already been constructed and

is in

limited operation,

pending completion of the South Boston and South Bay interchange portions of the system.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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The tunnel itself cost $327 million
cost of this section of the system is $421

represents the lowest cost of any of the eight project components.
to put into place,

million, only

and with the other allocations, the total

4.0% of total project cost.
Only the harbor

existing neighborhood.

The three
1.

floor,

is

the only portion of the project that did not disrupt an

home

to important fish species,

had to be protected.

essential connections include:

ANOC

The

This

connections (the Area North

Of Causeway

Street)

-

this

piece of the project

provides the connections of the underground portion of the Central Artery and Sumner-Callahan tunnels

with the existing Interstate 1-93 north of the Charles River via a
Leverett Circle via

and with Route

1

new

new

bridge, with

and the Tobin Bridge via ramps to the City Square tunnel

of the project, which

Storrow Drive

at

tunnels snaking around and under the North Station and the Fleet Center area,

is still

in the final

in

Charlestown. This part

design stage, has proven to be the most controversial Before the

was decided upon and approved by all concerned,

was a significant delay in the whole
project schedule as the design process went ahead. Despite the extensive and expensive efforts to
handle the environmental and esthetic concerns of the impacted communities, there are still law
suits pending on this section of the project According to many observers, the delay in obtaining
consensus on this segment added important costs to the program through inflation and additional project
elements. The centerpiece of the ANOC program will be an elegant single stay suspension bridge
current plan

designed to carry 1-93

traffic

program. This honor

is

across the Charles River. However, this

is

is

not the most costly piece of the

reserved to a complicated series of tunnels, ramps and viaducts needed to

provide the Storrow Drive- Route
of this system

there

1

and the Sumner-Callahan tunnels connections. Actual construction

estimated to cost $801 million, with a total cost of $1,354 billion including the

sizeable costs of design

and associated utility relocation. This represents 12.9% of total project cost,

the third largest of the eight components of the

CA/T project.

The Mass. Avenue connections — this piece of the project provides a new viaduct to connect the
South Bay entrance of the Central Artery with the Southeast Expressway where it intersects with Mass.

2.

CA/T project, for it
way through an area with less economic and
commercial activity than other areas. The total cost for the section, now well underway, is $369 million
or only 3.5% of the total, of which $255 million is actual construction.
Avenue

at the big bend. It is

probably the least complicated section of the entire

requires no tunneling and uses existing rights of

3.

The East Boston connections ~

emerges

in the

the adjacent

Logan Airport

this project involves

terminal area, with Route

North Shore communities.

It is

1

connecting the Ted Williams Tunnel, which

A in East Boston, the major highway serving

a complicated interchange involving not only connections

with the airport's terminal access roadways, but also present and future transit improvements to the

MBTA's

Blue Line, including a new airport

reached the

final

10.3% of the

station.

The engineering

for these connections has not

design stage. Currently these components are estimated to cost $1,074 billion, or

total,

McCormack Institute,

of which $774 million

is

in actual construction.
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Part

3.

THE BUDGET FOR MITIGATION

Scattered throughout the budgets allocated to the projects

The word "mitigation"

tor mitigation.

is

in

defined as "the lessening in force or intensity of

harshness or pain" resulting from a particular action. The term
the "urban surgery"

now

sums

these eight areas are substantial

is

most appropriate

in the

case of

being performed in the center of the Boston region as the Central

Artery/Tunnel project moves ahead.

Mitigation

planning and design scheme but also in

its

is

and has been a

critical

element not only

in the

overall execution.

The cost of mitigation can be viewed as the funds used to plan and build the highway system which
would not have been required if the highway were not built in such a difficult location. Indeed, one
can view the difference between the $2,564 billion initial estimate of 1985 and the $10.4+ billion in
the Finance Plan as attributable mainly to mitigation. Note that virtually all the elements of additional
cost are either related to scope changes designed to protect and enhance the urban and natural

environment or to the time taken to work out the details of the over 2,000 environmental mitigation

commitments
Chapter

1 .)

resulting

During

from the detailed planning, design and engineering process. (See Table 2

latter stages

in

of the planning and design process, the original 2,000 environmental

mitigation measures proposed were negotiated

down

to about 1,500.

For practical budgetary purposes, project management estimates that the cost for mitigation measures
has ranged from $2

billion to

more than $3

billion,

or nearly one third of the total project cost. (See

Table 2.7.) Within the context of the project's implementation, these measures
types: operational

and end-result mitigation.

fall into

two broad

Operational mitigation measures include those taken

during the project construction phase, such as traffic staging, general construction mitigation (noise

and dust), keeping the elevated artery

in operation during construction,

and some ecology-related

environmental mitigation such as the fish warning system used during underwater tunnel work. Endresult mitigation includes

community job

measures with a more permanent effect, including environmental protection,

training, archaeological/historical preservation,

and measures taken to improve some

aspect of transportation, pedestrian activity, and neighborhood aesthetics.

They also include projects

such as Spectacle Island, the South Boston Haul Road, and the reclamation of the Charles River
banks for park purposes.

A number of these projects were required for

the project to pass essential

environmental reviews as well as to secure needed funding and political support.

They

also

underscore largely unquantified future benefits that an area can gain from project mitigation measures.

Some

mitigation measures

Altogether,

fall into

both the operational and end-result categories.

MHD has formed a classification of these

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston

mitigation components. (See Table 2.8)
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Table

2.7- Mitigation

Cost Breakdown - $Cost in Millions
Operational

(Temporary
Accommodations)
City of Cambridge

ROWARS

$81.7

way acquisition &' remediation)
Northern Avenue ramp
South Boston Haul Road
(right of

Police Details

Impacts south of causeway
Right of way

$8.-

$68
$66
$60
$57.8

Transport of clay to municipal landfills

Premium for Excavated

Material

Rodent Control
Replacement parking for tour buses
Spectacle Island Dirt Disposal System
Fire Test program
Temporary traffic relief - South Bay
Cost to keep Artery open
Temporary barricades, walkways and lights for
vehicular and pedestrian traffic
Improvements to affected streets and walkways
Atlantic Avenue Bypass
MBTA Parking Garage
Improvements in East and South Boston to avoid
interference with airport and minimize noise
Red Line underpinning
Temporary Tobin Bridge loop ramp (CAN A)
City of Boston (for traffic planning)
Street Sweeping
Noise Control
Surface Artery

S80

traffic

management

$52
$50
$5
$5
$45
$44
$44
$400
$40
$37
$36
$35
$260
$25
$20
$20
$20
$20

$2
$2
$2
$17
$15
$15
$10
$10

City of Boston Consultant on traffic activity

Boston Fire Dept requirements
1-93 Northbound bypass

Noise Buffer Park
Interim ramp - Albany Street

Dust Control
Snowplowing
Community Group training
Redesign to accommodate Harbor Towers
Small Business Program

$1.8

$1.5
$1.3

Fish startle system

$1

Dirt removal safety

$1
$0.8

Boston Police Dept requirements

NE Aquarium walkway
Total

$0.4

(52% of mitigation cost)

$1648.8

End

Result

(Improvements)

Redesigned Charles River Crossing -increment
over Scheme

$351

Z

Charles River Basin Master Agreement

$80

Historical Conservation

$1

HOV Lanes
North End Ferry terminal

$649
$5
$3

East Boston Ferry terminal

$0.5

Wetlands replenishment

$2.5

Long

$0.5

Fort Point Channel improvements

Island restoration

Tunnel Covers - East Boston
Tunnel Covers/Roofs - South Boston
Spectacle Island Beach Nourishment

$58
$202.6

$8

Mass Ave Interchange
Total

Sources:

McCormack Institute,

CA/T project memoranda,

$ 1 94

(48% of mitigation

cost)

$1 337.6

contract listings, Boston Business Journal. 5/16-22, 1997

University of Massachusetts Boston
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Table 2.8

-

CA/T

Project Classification of Mitigation

Joint

Arts

Material Disposal

Building Design Elements
Construction Mitigation

Noise

Economic Compensation
Emergency Response
Highway Maintenance and

Pedestrian

Parks and

Overall, mitigation practices that have

which the project

to accept as the price

interaction.

Surface Restoration
Transportation: bicycle
parking, transit and traffic

Open Spaces

Utilities

Pest Control

Vibration

Public Outreach. Process

Water

and Signage
Right of Way

Operations
Historic Preservation

in

Roadway Design Elements

Development

Air Quality

urban environment

components

of building in

emerged from the project have been dictated by the difficult
is being built and the commitments that project sponsors had

this

environment.

required intense project-neighborhood

It

An extensive community- liaison network is in place to

focus on advance notification of

construction activities and related inconveniences. Through this mechanism groups in the affected

communities have significant influence

in

day-to-day construction operations. The public dimension

of the project involves an array of community based groups ranging from super coalitions

Move 2000

to smaller

groups representing

funds for community training.

Through

distinct constituencies

like

like the Fort Point artists

Mass
and

7

the umbrella groups, scores of private and nonprofit organizations have

complement the

come

to play an

mandated state and
federal agencies. Specifically, they independently track the 1500 mitigation measures which were the
quid-pro-quo for project acceptance. Changes in these commitments in the name of cost savings can
be expected to raise vehement and substantive protests from these groups.
important role

in project oversight to

role played

by the

legally

Cost pressures on the mitigation budgets
While the costs of the end-state mitigation measures are included
have either been

built

in the construction

program and

or have funds for them fully fixed and committed, the costs of the operational

mitigation measures are

more

variable.

For the most

part, these costs are

accounted for

specifications for each of the bid packages let out to the construction contracting teams.

the construction process

is in full

swing, especially in the

downtown

area, there is

in the

Now that

more hands-on

experience with the actual field conditions.

The consensus among contractors

whom we

interviewed

especially those related to abutter concerns, are far

is

that construction mitigation efforts,

more complex and more time consuming than they

MHD

Some contractors even expressed the opinion that CA/T and
managers should have
done more about dealing with abutter issues earlier in the project planning and design phase. Arguably
the most difficult mitigation-related issue from CA/T and MHD's perspective has involved the
expected.

7

SI. 525 million was earmarked for community based training in Boston and $.208 million was earmarked for
community based training in Cambridge. The intent of this item is to "provide minorities, women and residents of
the communities impacted by the project with access to job training opportunities associated with the project."

and substantive, from this program. (Source: CA/T Project Construction
1996 and
Central Artery Training Program: undated flyer; see also April
1997 op-ed piece by Joan Wallace Benjamin, President, Massachusetts Urban League.)

There have been benefits, both

Awards

List dated

December

McCormack Institute,

political

2,

MHD
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inherent conflict of interest that exists between business and residential interests. Conflicting needs

mean

that the scheduling of

work

concerned about rninimizing impacts

The

origins of this

dilemma

lie

at night to

in the

establishments and households share the
that is typical of significant portions of

traffic

moving;

more

residents are

reduce noise.

unique residential-business mix - where commercial

same or adjacent

structures and neighborhoods a situation

downtown Boston. Of

business-resident conflict is especially acute in the following

ANOC:

Businesses prefer to minimize

a delicate balancing act.

is

construction impacts during the daytime in order to keep

the eight major project areas, the

neighborhoods:

Charles River Park, Long fellow Place, Beacon

Hill,

Charlestown, East Cambridge,

North End
Artery North: Harbor Towers, Rowes Wharf, Leather District/South Street/Atlantic Avenue
Artery South: Chinatown, South End, Worcester Square, Ellis Neighborhood Group
Fort Point Channel: Loft District,

Summer Street

East Boston: Jeffries Point, "8A" Area.

MHD also acknowledges that construction has been noisier and dustier than anticipated.

The

single

biggest construction impact of concern to residents thus far has been noise and noise related activities.

Air quality complaints will increase as dust becomes a

more

difficult

problem during the summer

months, when construction activity picks up and more people are outdoors. Both noise and dust
complaints are likely to increase in the near term, as the pace and quantity of construction accelerates
and diminish in another IViiol years once the project goes underground.

The

work during daytime
accommodate

current construction sequence encourages contractors to do the noisiest

hours. If contractors go outside contractual

work hour

restrictions in order to

MHD

neighborhood complaints, change claims are generated. Information from both
and contractors
indicates that, in order to preserve understanding and goodwill, contractors have generally responded
to direct requests of the communities without putting in immediate change orders. However, the
project's heavy construction phase has not yet begun in earnest in the residential areas that are likely
to experience significant construction impact.

8

In anticipation of an increase in noise-related complaints, project managers, contractors, and

community groups have been experimenting with innovative methods
project has also increased

its

include tighter restrictions, and there

'Also, project noise limit specifications are set at
inhabited, the

the

background noise level

is

in a

is

neighborhood located within

is

no more than 5 decibels over the background noise

so

its

large, pervasive

level for the city. Because Boston is so densely
can be operating within project noise specifications and still be too noisy from

and well-known

that

it

has experienced a "lightening rod" effect in that unrelated

boundaries are attributed to the project. For example, some North

End residents recently complained

about dust being generated by the project even though construction had not yet begun in the their particular locale.

McCormack Institute,

The

Future contract specifications
some community pressure to apply the new restrictions

fairly high; therefore, contractors

community's perspective. The project

problems

for noise niinimization.

own monitoring and enforcement efforts.
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retroactively. Contractors are willing to comply with tighter standards but would expect to be
compensated. Clearly, construction operational mitigation issues contain seeds for upward pressure

00 project

costs.

The

project has negotiated

some

night

work within

certain parameters.

According to CA/T- MHD, the end cost to the project of delaying the schedule by not doing
any work at night would be an additional $20-$30 million per month.

Project staff have described the mitigation process as "evolutionary."

If this process entails a
continued proactive approach - but one that does not impose additional costs - total mitigation costs

may

not increase. Unexpected issues, disputes or aggressive

community advocacy

begins in particular neighborhoods or areas could create an upward cost trend.

Part

4.

SCOPE CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS

As an essential part of our analysis, we examined the
in the

as construction

9

scope of the project and

its

possibilities for cost reduction

through changes

various elements, ranging from halting or putting a moratorium on

current construction activities to possible reductions in the size of various components.

A

moratorium on construction

If construction

were halted now, when close to two-thirds of the funds have been committed, the

region would lose the benefits of the segments already completed and for the next decades traffic
circulation

would continue

to deteriorate with serious consequences for

region as a whole. With construction started on

make

the traffic system

work with

all

the elements in place already. There

associated with contract close-out and related litigation.

•

The value of the completed investment

in the

As a

•

essentially the

same as

it is

The Central Artery would remain
becoming

less

and

neighborhoods as

less safe,
it

as

would be additional cost

result:

Ted Williams Tunnel would be marginalized

because there would be no convenient connection between

would be

downtown Boston and the
is no convenient way to

major components, there

it

and

1-90.

Access to the airport

today.
it is

today, but continuing to deteriorate structurally,

and continuing the pollutive and blighting

effects

on the adjacent

does today.

A recent Boston Business Journal article (May 16-22,

recounts the concerns of small business owners impacted by construction, and claims that
Program (used for assisting small businesses with promotional materials) in no way compensates
for loss in sales and other revenue. Pressures from this business group may abate once construction moves underground; however, continued revenue losses
and possible building damage caused by underground digging could drive costs upward.

9

1 997)

the S 1 .3 million set aside for the project's Small Business

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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Any program

•

to

make

the improvements later in the next century

would cost

more than the $3.8 billion remaining to be committed, given inflation and
that would be required. This option would be close to catastrophic.

substantially

the re-engineering

Reducing the scope of the remaining elements

We have studied the

management proposals to reduce the scope of remaining elements of
some ramps and interchange connections and reducing some
travel lane capacity. Nine of these were presented in the Finance Plan of September, 1996, with a
combined reduction of close to $1.4 billion, or about 29% of the remaining construction costs. The
Finance Plan proposals are discussed below by size of potential reduction.
project

the project, principally

by cutting out

.

South Bay Interchange --

eliminating the 1-90/ 1-93 connections

—

($500 million)

— would involve

from the construction program currently underway the complicated set of ramps
connecting the two interstate routes. This would result in a situation in which North-South traffic
on 1-93 would not have access to the MassPike or the Ted Williams Tunnel, nor would the 1-90
eliminating

traffic

have access to the Southeast expressway and the Central Artery as it has today. Each Interstate

route would thus serve only through movement, without the convenient possibility to interconnect,

except through local streets. This solution would severely limit the value of the whole

by

restricting the convenient interchange

of multi-directional

metropolitan highway system. Project management

lists

the

traffic at

CA/T program

key point

in the

whole

the probability of this solution as very low,

probably unacceptable to the Federal Highway Administration, environmental agencies, and the
affected local communities.

The

re-engineering required

would provide major delays

in the

construction schedule.

East Boston infrastructure improvements — curtailing the current program — ($350 million) —
would involve rearranging the timetable and design of the connectors joining the Ted Williams Tunnel
to

Route

1

A to

allow better solutions for the

traffic circulation in the

Airport. Relocation of the Airport station of the Blue Line
present, these

improvements are included as part of the

is

whole area north of Logan

an essential part of the program. At

CA/T project,

but

some observers

feel that

program of airport and related
improvements, with a revised and stretched out timetable. Others feel that these improvements should
continue as part of CA/T, to insure that both traffic solutions are in place as soon as possible and
environmental commitments are met. This piece of the project has not yet gone to final design. As
a result, there may still be some room to rearrange some of the project elements and save some cost
to the CA/T project by assigning the construction management to Massport engineering staff and
consultants. However, changing the existing arrangements would only contribute to cost savings if
MPA, MBTA, MHD and the local community could agree on the best way to handle the situation.
the project should be designed and constructed as part of Massport's

ANOC

-

Leverett Circle

-

deleting planned intersection improvements

-

($200 million)

-

would

involve keeping the existing configuration of the Leverett Circle intersection, a major congestion

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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point at present.

The whole area around North

Station and the Fleet Center

undergoing major
change at the moment. Plans for handling connections to the Central Artery are an essential piece of
an improvement program which includes building a new tunnel for the Green Line to connect to
is

Lechmcre and a new Orange Line-Green Line transfer station adjacent to the Artery. Some observers
improvements could be deferred and made part of a larger program involving improvements
to MBTA's Green Line, while others feel that without these improvements as part of the CA/T
feel these

project, this area will continue to be a

major

be disruptive and require delays to secure

ANOC

traffic bottleneck.

Changing the plans

new environmental and

at this stage

would

other approvals.

Storrow Drive/ Artery connection — deleting planned connecting tunnels ~ ($ 100 million)
— would involve eliminating the tunnels designed to connect Storrow Drive to the Central Artery and
-

Sumner-Callahan tunnels. While
with Leverett Circle
not

built.

To

in the

this

connection

North Station

area,

it

is

made today by

the viaduct connecting the Artery

would be eliminated

were
would have
and West End

in the future if the tunnels

get to the Artery and the Sumner-Callahan tunnels, Storrow Drive traffic

to use local streets. This

would create serious

traffic

problems for the Beacon

communities and would open up controversies which have been long

Hill

settled in the planning process.

Redesign would hold up the project schedule.

1-90

and 1-93

million)

more

HOV

lanes

-

deleting planned extra lanes for high

this would involve removing the

flexibility in the traffic

feel the

to

—

occupancy vehicles

—

($100

HOV lanes which were added to the project to provide
Some observers
others feel that to spend so much money

flows to meet the standards for modern urban highways.

HOV lanes are not workable and not really essential,
interstate segments without HOV lanes would be "penny-wise and pound foolish."
a "notice of project change" would be required. FHWA and other supporters of the HOV

improve these

Again,

system could be counted on to raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the move.

South Boston Interchange — deleting planned access point to seafront area — ($ 50 million) —
would involve deleting the intersection which provides the main new access to the South Boston
seafront area. It would thus hamper new road access to this area and decrease the potential of the
area to handle new economic development. As a result, one of the key land development benefits of
the whole CA/T scheme would be lost, along with the opportunity of this area to contribute more
to the tax base of Boston.

Central Artery

-

Dewey Square Tunnel ~

deleting planned

improvements

—

($

50

million)

—

eliminating the project to realign the existing walls in the Dewey Square tunnel to
make for easier and safer traffic movements. This could be done without major schedule impacts, but

would involve

would lower the standards for the Central Artery from a traffic flow point of view. Because of tighter
turning and weaving patterns, some element of danger would be added to the new Artery when
completed.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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Central Artery
eliminate a
traffic

-

Ramp R-T —

ramp now planned

eliminating access to surface streets

for the Atlantic

onto the local street system

in

Avenue

area; the

~

main effect

($ 25 million)

would be

to

- would

dump more

and around South Station and the financial district. That would

not be in the best interests of improving the environment in

this

important

downtown activity center.

Charles River Bridge — change bridge design — ($ 10 million) — would cut back on the
aesthetic quality of the single stay suspension bridge crossing the Charles, which would require
opening the environmental review process in the CA/T's most controversial area.

ANOC

-

Most of these changes would diminish the ability of the system to function to its most efficient
level, cause more traffic to circulate in local neighborhoods, and bring into question the
approvals for mitigation and environmental protection agreed upon to meet federal and state
regulations and requirements of local communities. As a result, we do not feel that these types
of scope reductions should be considered, except under the most adverse circumstances. They
would be counter- productive, raise the possibilities of more delay and controversy, and not
be in the best interests of the Commonwealth and the mission of the federal highway program.

McCormack Institute,

University of Massachusetts Boston
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CHAPTER 3 -- COST CONTAINMENT/ REDUCTION POTENTIALS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
With more than 70% of the budget committed, more than 50% obligated, and more than 40%
10
already disbursed
there is little opportunity to significantly reduce the overall budget for
the project at this advanced stage.
,

As pointed out in Chapter 2, reducing the scope of the project would not, in our view, be wise public
policy for it would negate too many of its long term benefits for the traveling public and affected
communities,

and create serious

legal,

administrative

and other problems for which the

Commonwealth would have to suffer the consequences. The budget includes extensive commitments
to a wide variety of community and environmental interests, many of whose concerns are protected
by law. While it is likely that the federal funding available in the future will not be of the proportion
expected when the project was conceived in the 1970's and 1980's, there should be enough from
federal sources to help the

However, as we

Commonwealth complete

will discuss in

Chapter

portion of the costs. Unless there

proceed,

on

tight

is

5, state

the project within overall budget parameters.

and local resources

may be

required to pay a larger

an unanticipated funding disaster and the project cannot

we assume that the best course is to complete the project as soon as possible, relying
budget controls and efficient and effective management of the construction process

to insure completion at the lowest possible cost

We have examined the question of how much cost saving potential there is in the CA/T project at this
is more
by the end of the year.
We have done this over the last few months through discussions with project management,
construction contractors, oversight agencies, community groups and others. In this chapter, we will

stage, considering that almost all the final engineering designs are complete, construction

25% complete and most of the remaining 75%

than

review our findings and conclusions in this regard,

and second, by describing

likely,

construction process in

Part

Our

1.

-CA/T

its

is

to be put under contract

first

by examining the budget scenarios that appear

cost containment and reduction measures applicable to the

current state, as identified through our contacts.

BUDGET SCENARIOS

analysis of the potential to reduce

and contain costs

is

described by the various scenarios under

which the CA/T budget would either expand or decrease. (See Table 3.1) To reduce the overall
budget by a major amount, by 10% or more than $1.0+ billion, (Scenario A), some drastic

would be required which would have severe negative consequences. These actions
would include reducing the scope of the remaining elements through extensive elimination of planned
capacities and interchange movements. This would result in reducing the traffic performance of the
actions

" As of the CA/T Monthly Management Report of March, 1997

— page

17a "Committed" refers to the dollar value of work that has been agreed
work performed under contract; since the work has been performed as

to through contract. "Obligated" refers to dollar value of that portion of the

agreed

to,

the contracting agent has an obligation to pay for the work.
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entire system.

Local neighborhood streets would be

left

to

absorb the burden. This would also entail

possible reduction or elimination of mitigation measures already included in the construction
pactntflftS, a situation

which could bring on consequent costs and damage claims from community and
It would also require renegotiation of agreements with federal

environment groups, and contractors.

agencies and local interests, along with extensive redesign and engineering.

Another possible device to
elements out of the

significantly decrease the

CA/T program

CA/T budget would

be to transfer major scope

to the budgets of other agencies, such as the Massachusetts Port

(MPA), Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), or the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA), and to defer construction until each agency could absorb the
Authority

costs.

However,

this is

no

real cost saving.

It is

cost deferral at best, with possible consequent higher

costs at a later date.

At the other extreme, an increase of the budget of 10%+ or more than $1.0+ billion (Scenario
come about with major traumatic incidents in the current construction environment.

E), could

This could include extensive delays in the construction schedule caused by any combination of the
following: unfavorable lawsuits, (at least one suit

-

mainly involving the Central Artery North Area

(CANA) construction program on the Cambridge side of the Charles River - is still pending); major
new scope or mitigation measures not currently planned (possibly resulting from unforeseen problems
with local communities); extensive contractor claims resulting from unresolved disputes; and/or
construction disasters involving very high insurance claims that would ultimately force the

program

to absorb higher insurance

premiums. In addition, a local economic downturn might also

possibly force costs above the current plan.
project.

However,

CA/T

the construction process

None of

still

these possible traumas has yet affected the

has six years more to run.

Keeping the project within current budget parameters (Scenario C) will be no easy task.

It will

require continued application of strong cost containment measures and adherence to the construction

schedule, particularly for those construction packages on the critical path. Because of the complicated

sequencing of these packages,
in

it

is

essential that contractors keep to the planned schedules, for delays

one package could hold up the work of the next and

budget parameters

coming

in

below

some of the

result in greater overall cost. Staying within

will also require that the project maintain its current pattern

office estimates.

largest

and most

So

far, this

of construction bids

pattern (see table 3.2) has been relatively stable, but

difficult contracts

remain to be

trend, the pattern of change orders submitted and acted

bid. Also, to

accompany

this positive

on favorably must be kept within the current

budget parameters, and contractor claims kept to the current low

2%

rate.

4%, or from

$ $250 to $450 million,
(Scenario D) could occur with schedule delays and minor problems in the construction process.

Increases in the current budget in the range of

to

CA/T's magnitude, this level of change is not unusual. Indeed in the process of
reviewing the Monthly Management reports since the beginning of the year, we have noted some
upward movement in the construction budget that reflects some of these pressures. Schedule slippage
in any major construction package, particularly those on the critical path, will increase costs, as will
construction problems in tunneling, particularly since some unforeseen soil and utility conditions are
not covered in the construction contracts and change orders would be required. Mitigation measures
In a project of
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required but unanticipated in the office estimates for critical program packages in

downtown Boston

could also exert upward pressure on the costs, In addition, a pattern of future construction bids

would also have the same effect. Higher labor
costs resulting from shortages in key skills could be one possible cause, along with "contractor
overload," resulting in fewer contractors showing up to bid on future contracts.
consistently higher than the pattern experienced to date

To achieve an equivalent level of budget reductions in

the scale of 2% to

4%, or $250 to $450

would have to rely principally on measures to avoid all delays
and unanticipated changes in planned scope for all remaining construction packages plus good
luck in completing packages on critical path ahead of schedule. This will require the active
application of as many as possible of the cost saving techniques available to project management and
million, (Scenario B), the project

contractors involved in the construction process. Application of these techniques requires extensive

cooperation

among all the "parties at interest", not only the project management and the contractors,

but the Legislature, other state regulatory agencies, and local communities as well.
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Table

St

KYVRIO

LEVEL OF

3.1

--CA/T

BUDGET SCENARIOS

PERFORMANCE REQl 1RFMFNTS

CHANCE
A.

LEVEL

S v\

1

INGS

-OVER 10%

WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR SCOPE CHANGES-

•$1.1+ B.

--extensive elimination of planned capacities and interchange

movements
--

resulting in reduced

system performance

extensive elimination of mitigation measures already included

in construction

packages (with possible consequent costs and

damage claims)
--

repermitting and renegotiation of agreements with Federal

Agencies and local

—

B.

LEVEL 2

-2%

TO 4%

-$250/$450

M.

CA/T program to

other agencies

savings)

(not real

SAVINGS

interests

transfer major scope out of

WOULD REQUIRE SCHEDULE ADVANCES —

avoid

all

delays and unanticipated changes in planned scope

plus luck in completing construction packages

on

critical

-

path

ahead of schedule

— active

application of

all

cost saving techniques in the

construction process, including faster processing of change
orders and

VECP's, bulk purchasing,

etc.

— early phase out of project management consultant

CCURRENT

$10.4+ B.

BUDGET

($11.0 B.)

WILL REQUIRE STRONG COST AND SCHEDULE
CONTAINMENT ~

(escalated)

no change orders other than those anticipated to date or

absolutely necessary

— current schedule of critical path items kept without interruption
— no extraordinary patterns of bids exceeding office estimates (so
far,

so good)

— claims rate kept to current minimum
~ consideration of change orders and VECP's

only with

construction period, rather than long term, impacts

D.

LEVEL 1

INCREASES

+

2% TO 4%

+$250/$450 M.

COULD OCCUR WITH SCHEDULE DELAYS AND
MINOR CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS -—

schedule slippage in any major construction package,

particularly those

— unforeseen
with

soil,

on the

critical

path

construction problems in tunneling, particularly

water or

utility conditions

— unforeseen mitigation measures required
—
E.

LEVEL 2

INCREASES

(C15A1 example)

future construction bids pattern higher than estimates

OVER 10%

COULD OCCUR WITH MAJOR TRAUMA

+1.0+ B.

~ extensive delay s caused by unfavorable lawsuits (Cambridge)
— major new scope or mitigation measures not currently planned
— major contractor claims
— planned cost savings unrealized
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Part

The

2.

-MEASURES TO CONTAIN OR REDUCE COSTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS

setting for cost

containment and reduction

At this advanced stage in the construction process, the dynamics of interactions among the "owner,"
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Joint Venture program manager and design/engineering
team, and the construction contractors, along with the affected "communities" will determine the
ability to control, contain, and possibly reduce project costs. The laws of the Commonwealth
governing the construction process for receiving and accepting contract bids; for abiding by labor,
environment, and other regulations; and for resolving disputes among the affected parties, provide
the backdrop for these dynamics. In our discussions with project management staff, construction
contractors, oversight agencies, community groups and others, a series of measures have been
identified that could be introduced or improved upon to help contain and reduce costs in the
construction process. Some of the measures would require action by the state legislature, some upon
the cooperation of other state agencies to improve administrative reviews, but many could be
accomplished through changes in present project management practices. These measures fall into
the

the following categories:

A. The bidding process for construction contracts
1. expansion of the bidders pool
2.

bid acceptance policy

3. the

4.

A-B

bidding process

exemption from

filed sub-bid

B. Construction contract

requirements

management

1.

partnering policy

2.

change order policy

3.

the

VECP policy

C. Environmental assistance
1.

review process relief

2. soil
3.

handling definitions

additional landfill sites

D. Other measures

This

list is

1.

police details

2.

insurance program

3.

approval of plans for vertical construction

may be other cost saving measures identified in the course of
However, they are the measures most frequently noted by those actively
the CA/T construction program at the present time.

not exhaustive; and there

the construction process.

engaged

in
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:

A. The bidding process for construction contracts

The CA/T program Is currently in the most active period of letting construction contracts. While
many contracts have already been let, there are enough remaining to warrant attention to those
factors in the bidding process which can help reduce costs. There are a number of these as described
below

1.

Expansion of the bidders pool

One

of the keys to keeping construction costs under control

to receive the

is to

insure that the project continues

lowest possible bids from construction contractors. So

far,

the experience with

receiving bids below the office estimates has been good (see table 3.2). However, there

concern that

this trend will not

is

some

continue unless the number of new construction contractors expands;

management has conducted an active program to interest prospective contractors. To date,
most of the lowest bids have been submitted and won by a small group of about 14 prime
contractors. One of these has been involved as a lead or sub contractor on close to half of the
contracts issued. On the one hand, the successful contractors feel that the size of the bidding pool
project

They note that the successful firms are able to handle the complicated demands of the
"know the territory," and are able to secure the performance bonds needed to bid.
Furthermore, the community groups most affected by the construction program feel that the
is

adequate.

project,

experienced contractors have learned to deal with their concerns, a situation that

new

may not exist with

construction contractors.
Table 3.2

-

Difference between

Low Bids and

Office Estimates

(by Year of Award, $K)

Year

Total

No. of Contracts

Amount

Below Office

Average Amount
Per Contract

Estimate

1990

2

(578)

(289)

1991

8

(34,353)

(4,294)

1992

8

(83,636)

(10,455)

1993

12

(72,863)

(6,072)

1994

13

(67,264)

(5,174)

1995

13

(104,122)

(8,009)

1996

13

(64,300)

(4,946)

1997

2

40,061

20,030

thru

January
Total

71

(387,055)

(5,451)
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CA/T management

provided a

of

listing

all

bidders at bid openings through April

1,

1997.

11

Table

3.3 shows the bid openings divided into groupings based on the office estimates. Bidding history
shows that the larger the dollar value of contracts, the smaller the group of bidders. Except for
Groups D and E, the number of bidders seems adequate; in these last two groups competition might
be enhanced if future contracts can be divided into smaller pieces. Nearly all the bidders in Group E
were joint ventures. 12
Table 3.3 - CA/T Project Bid Openings

roup

A
B

# of Bids per Opening

$0-$10M.

43

5.23

$50 M.
$50 - $100 M.
$100 - $200 M.
$200 - $450 M.

D
E

project

# of Bid Openings

$10

C

The

Dollar Range

-

management has

initiated a

are not eager to participate in the

make

it

7.50

7

4.71

7

4.14

10

3.50

nationwide program to recruit additional

prospective

on the large packages. We have heard
many of the nation's larger highway construction contractors

construction contractors in an effort to encourage

unconfirmed reports, however, that

15

CA/T program,

more

bids

fearing the difficult challenges of the project will

hard to achieve expected margins on the work.

management alike which could
The amount of CA/T construction now

In addition, a potential problem of concern to the contractors and

drive up the cost of future bids

a shortage of skilled labor.

is

under conn-act is so massive that most of the skilled labor pool available locally is already employed.
The ability of existing contractors to keep their work force scheduled on successive contracts is an
advantage for their keeping their bids low.
future,

The

If the past pattern

of low bids does not hold up in the

however, there will be upward pressure on the construction budget.

situation involving the size

and nature of the bidding pool needs careful monitoring on

the part of project management, including measures to insure that incentives remain for

contractors to bid competitively on the

11

In the following discussion

some

figures

program packages yet

may not add up

figures in the tabulations and also to the fact that

to

be awarded.

exactly due to either variations in the office estimates or missing

some award

prices were in one group while the office estimate

was

in another;

however, the overall figures are approximately correct.

12

Some

federal agencies hold to a policy that requires a

considered valid; otherwise the contract

is

minimum

of three valid bids in order for a bid opening to be

re-bid.
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2.

Bid acceptance policy

in ihe bidding process is the disparity some CA/T projects have experienced
between the office estimate for a particular construction package and the price of the contract
awarded, especially when the awarded contract is substantially above the office estimate. At present,
we understand that there is no set policy within CA/T for bid acceptance. In the award of military

Oi equal concern

construction contracts,

awarded

it

is

common

practice to set a limit on

Quite often bids that vary by more than

the office estimate.

until the office estimate is reconciled

hold, and the firm that prepared the plans

how much the low bid can vary from
10% from the office estimate are not

with the bid received. The bid opening

and specifications reviews

bid submitted to detect any causes for the differences.
identified and corrected, the bid opening

is

its

is

put on

cost estimate and the

If the differences

canceled and the contract

low

cannot be successfully

is re-bid.

This

process

provides protection against runaway costs and the award of contracts that are excessive.
In the above listing of CA/T contracts, there are ten contracts awarded where the bid was 20% or
more above the office estimate; in most cases, they were between 20 and 40% higher, with one of
them 3577c higher than the office estimate. Even contracts awarded at bids below the office estimate
are significant since they often can be a harbinger of excessive change order demands later on. In
the above groupings there are thirty-four contracts awarded at prices that were more than 20%
bbelow the office estimate and another fourteen that were between 10 and 20% below the office

estimate.

In view of the detailed

and

costly engineering efforts of the

section designers to create solid plans

and

contract that

3.

the

warrant

Consideration should be given

award to reviewing the reliability of the office estimate and the low bid on any
outside a

falls

10% parameter of the office estimate.

The A-B bidding process

The Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) wants to use an
bidding, called
that interface

A-B

critical path.

In order to use

it;

A-B

as other alternative

The design/ build option

responsibility"

involves

some

-

method of construction

The MHD believes they could do this under existing law,

Attorney General sustained a bid protest against

149 did not allow

alternative

bidding, as a schedule optimization measure on discrete CA/T project segments

and are on the

Chapters 30 and 149 of the Massachusetts General Laws.

13

management and

specifications, this situation appears to

careful evaluation with tightened procedures, if necessary.

before contract

project

A-B

On November

6,

1996, the State

bidding on the grounds that Chapters 30 and

the Superior Court upheld the Attorney General's ruling.

MHD has submitted a bill, H. 1 17, that would authorize its use, as well
13
The bill directs
methods of construction such as design-build, turnkey, etc.

bidding,

The laws of the Commonwealth governing public construction mandate that there be a clear

between the designer/engineer

cut "division of labor and

who determines the scope and specifications for a project and the contractor who builds

it.

This process

duplication of costs in the design process and sometimes prevents the designer from having the benefit of a construction contractor's

knowledge of technique and the contractor from having the ongoing benefit of the designer's skills. This is a problem in a complicated project like the
"big dig" where there are so many unknowns in the process of building underground in an old urban environment that it is hard for the designer to

40

MHD to procure a sufficient number of contracts using such alternatives to permit evaluation

of

their effectiveness in terms of time and cost savings.
A report must be
Committee on Transportation and the House and Senate Committees on Ways and Means along with
recommendations by June 30, 1999.

filed with the Joint

A-B

In

sum of items contained in the Schedule of Quantities and Prices
Estimated Contract Price" (Part A). Bidders also submit the number of days

bidding, bidders submit the

as their "Total

and 100), prior to the contract completion date specified in the bid invitation package,
within which they will complete performance of the work. The number of "saved" days is
multiplied by a value calculated by
for each saved construction day to arrive at an
"Adjustment for Days Saved" (Part B). The Adjustment for Days Saved is subtracted from the
(between

MHD

Estimated Contract Price to arrive

The bidder submitting

at the

"Proposal Price."

the lowest Proposal Price wins the contract bid.

However, the successful

bidder will be paid the Total Estimated Contract Price. Should the successful bidder fail to perform
within the time in the contract, he/she will be assessed liquidated damages for each saved day that
is

delayed or not realized. Under this bidding method, a successful bidder

the lowest Total Estimated Contract Price

work on

among

the bidders.

A-B

may riot necessarily have

bidding would be used only for

the project critical path.

Saving days will save money. Money would be saved because the project that next interfaces
can start earlier. No overall cost savings can be estimated, however, because there has been
no public construction experience with A-B bidding in Massachusetts, although it has been
used in other jurisdictions.
Several contractors

who were interviewed strongly opposed A-B

vulnerable to fraud. In

fact,

bidding because they believe

it is

Construction Industries of Massachusetts (CIM) was the plaintiff in a

The contractors argue that a contractor, in order to get CA/T
number of days saved. After winning the contract, the contractor
will do anything to insure that failure to achieve days saved cannot be blamed on him to avoid
liquidated damages. If CIM' s argument proves to be true, no savings would accrue by this method,
and, indeed, could cost the project and the taxpayer more. At this stage, however, there is no hard
recent case before the Superior Court.

contracts, will bid an unrealistic

evidence to support this contention. Enactment of a
authorize

A-B

bidding;

number of construction

it

new law by

the Legislature is needed to

should be enacted as soon as possible, considering the considerable

contracts to be let this calendar year.

know what to specify in the designs and hard for the construction contractor to formulate a realistic bid. To solve this problem nationwide and to
new practice
called "design/build" which breaks down this division of labor by allowing a construction project to accept bids from contracting organizations which
possibly reduce the costs of major public projects, the engineering/construction industry along with "public owners" have been using a

will

combine both the

final engineering design

and the construction in the same construction contract, thus saving costs in both the design and
somewhat and could remove from the owner the protection offered by an independent

construction process. While this blurs responsibility

engineer/designer

who can represent him during

the construction process,

reducing costs on expensive public works project. For the
tried

and at

this stage

of the project with virtually

all

CA/T

it is

being actively considered by

many public agencies

as a

program, the laws and practices of the Commonwealth did not allow
final designs complete, its use as a cost saving technique is largely academic.

means of
method to be

this
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Since

CA/T management

believes this

would encourage bids which would help the

overall

and thereby save cost, it deserves consideration. A discrete test period should
be authorized to disprove or prove the arguments for A-B bidding. The law should expire at
the end of the test period, June 30, 1999. If test results prove the value of A-B bidding, the
law authorizing the same could be made permanent.
project schedule

4.

Exemption from

sub-bid requirements

filed

The Ward Commission in 1980 recommended the repeal of the filed sub-bid law; however, their
recommendation was never followed. There are significant potential savings to the CA/T
project if the Legislature suspends the filed sub-bid provisions of Chapter 149 as it applies to
the project The savings might be in the order of $10 million.
Under Massachusetts law, the
called "vertical construction")

This provision applies

selection of sub-contractors on public construction of buildings (so
must be done independently of the selection of the general contractor.

to sub-contractors involving

some 17

different crafts, including electricians,

plumbers, painters, installers of elevators, heating and air-conditioning and others. The subcontractors
file

separate bids which are opened

two days before the general contractors' bids are opened. The

general contractors must then select one of the sub-bidders. With essentially no time to check the subbidders qualifications and performance potentials and with their costs added to their own, the general
contractors almost always select the lowest bidder. Thus, as a practical matter, the general contractor

has no significant role in selecting subcontractors and
the quality

little

leverage in coordinating and enforcing

and timeliness of their performance.

Although most of the CA/T project involves "horizontal" construction (tunnels and viaducts) to
which filed sub-bid provisions do not apply, the provisions do apply to the ventilation buildings
required as part of the tunnel components. Because they are integral parts of tunnel construction and
operation, there is no particular reason that they should not be included directly in the construction
packages for the tunnels, except for the provisions of the filed sub-bid requirement. There are more
vent buildings required in the CA/T project than in any other similar project built in the U.S. The
14
need to accept filed sub-bids on these projects has already had a negative effect in project costs.
Of the eight called for in the plan, only three remain to be bid. Their estimated cost is $97 million.
A reasonable estimate is that the filed sub-bid provisions will directly add about 10% to the bids for
these packages. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) sought a similar exemption for
the Boston Harbor project, after having the results of a study by Cambridge Systematics which
estimated that from 7.5% to 11.5% would be added to the contracts to which the filed sub-bid
provisions

14

would

apply.

15

management reported that there have been the predicted difficulties with this procedure. Sub-contractors procured
way often did not show up to work on their project, a situation which required the MHD staff to track down the subs

Project
in this

and bring them to the work site. In other instances, the low bids received (for roofing and elevator installation, for example)
were close to double the office estimates for the work and required substantial redesign and schedule delays Had the bids
been part of the prime contractor's responsibility, they would have been more in line with project requirements.
.

In interviews with contractors,

involving filed sub-bids.

The bids

working with subcontractors with

Cambridge Systematics found
are increased

whom

by up

to

3%

that they increased their bids

to account for the higher

by up to

management

9%

on projects

costs (about

15%) of

they have not previously worked to cover extra field personnel, extra meetings,
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and

In addition, there

is

a strong possibility that the

work contracted by

potential schedule delays, particularly for projects

with responsibility for the overall schedule, has

on the

little

this

critical path.

method

will contribute to

Since the prime contractor

leverage over the subs (who are in effect hired

by the "owner"), the completion schedule is often at the mercy of the subs who may demand more
(in the form of change orders) to keep to the prime's schedule. On a project with critical
time pressures, it is much more efficient to have the prime contractor in complete control of the
work schedule and performance as would be the case if the filed sub-bid procedure were not in

money

force.

The filed sub-bid procedure is defended by subcontractors who fear that prime contractors will wait
until they

have a contract award, then use

possible price.

Many

their considerable leverage to

shop around for the best

of the construction trade unions also support the system in order to protect

themselves from the possibility of work being given to non-union subs. Since

all

CA/T

contracts

by labor agreements that specify all work to be done at union wage rates, the fear of
subcontractors being hired at below union wage is minimal. Nonetheless, there is a long standing
alliance between some of the craft unions and the subcontractors to insure hiring their members,
a situation which the filed sub-bid systems helps protect. Under the proposed plan union wages
would still be paid, with the prime contractors controlling the process. However, they may not be
held necessarily to the boundaries between crafts as defined by the craft unions.
are covered

The

CA/T program from this exemption are possible only if the
new few months to suspend the provisions of Chapter 149 as they

potential savings to the

Legislature acts within the

apply to the CA/T project (Such action has already been taken by the legislatures of
Connecticut and New York which repealed their equivalents to their filed sub/bid
requirements.) If such an exemption were also applied to the construction of the Logan 2000
plan, savings to the Commonwealth could be substantial. We recommend that the Legislature
act to allow this exemption-at least on a trial basis-a move supported by CA/T management
and the other affected agencies.

B. Construction contract

This

is

management

an area in which the

CA/T management, MHD, FHWA, and

the oversight agencies have

made a major effort since the beginning of the heavy construction period in the early 1990's. The
project management team has tried to anticipate difficult construction situations by learning from
However, there are three

and applications which are the most critical
to the ability of the project to contain and possibly reduce costs. These are partnering policy,
change order policy, and value engineering change proposals policy. All these are the
responsibility of the program management team.
the past.

interrelated policies

intense monitoring of their work. In addition, up to 4% is added to the bidder's contingency allowance to
cover the problems of working with up to 17 different subcontractors, potential delays, disputes between the subs,

more

resolving gaps and overlaps in

work assignments and

others.
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1.

Partnering policy

The construction

industry has experienced an unprecedented growth in claims and litigation over

the past ten to twenty years.

project

Disputes inevitably involve the owners and their representatives (the

manager and section designers) and

the

many

contractors and sub-contractors on the job.

Conflicts also arise between general contractors and their subs. Unresolved disputes fester and
into

work stoppages,

ultimately leading to litigation with consequent

grow
work slow downs and

disruption of schedules, poor morale and, not surprisingly, poorer safety records. All these effects
result in additional costs.

There are a number of
responsibility

among

techniques which can help reduce the costly effects of the division of

the owner-project manager, engineer/designer, and construction contractor.

been used extensively by the CA/T project is "partnering", a method of putting the
program manager and the successful contractor into a working relationship to avoid the

One

that has

Both project management
and contractors credit the partnering program for the exceptionally low claims experience
on the CA/T program to date.
confrontational disputes that result in costly claims and project delays.

In 1992, the Massachusetts

Highway Department (MHD) decided to

Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project, challenging
they would promote cooperation
partnering, a concept

meant

among

try "Partnering" on the Central
companies that were part of the project to pledge that
16
parties for their mutual benefit.
In the CA/T project

all

all

to mitigate the typically adversarial relationship

among

construction

parties, is incorporated at four levels:

—Contract Partnering
-Inter-Contract Partnering
—Internal Partnering

—Partnering with

Community Groups

Contract Partnering involved bilateral agreements between Contract Management teams (FHWA,
MHD, B/PB) and the Section Designers during the design phase of the project or with the General
Construction Contractors during the construction phase. Third parties were invited to participate
in each of these phases and included organizations such as MP A, MBTA, Sub-Contractors, etc.
Inter-Contract Partnering was initiated by the CA/T Area Construction Managers as a multilateral agreement among the Construction Contract Management Team (FHWA, MHD, B/PB),
usually at the area management level and two or more general construction contractors working in
confined or adjacent areas. Third parties may participate but generally the agreement is to focus the
parties on ways to coordinate their work activities and to accomplish their respective contracts with
minimum interference from one another. When applicable, normal construction Contract Partnering
is used to interface with interested third parties.

16 'Partnering"

is

an alternative for doing business where

introduced to the construction industry by the U.S.

all

the parties

Army Corps

make long term commitments

of Engineers back

in

1988 and

is

to achieve

rapidly

common

becoming

goals.

part of every

It

was

major

construction project undertaken in the United States today.
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Internal Partnering has

MHD, Joint Venture),

many

Most include

forms.

although some are limited to

the Joint Venture partners.

the Contract

Management Team (FHWA,

MHD- Joint Venture or to internal problems of

In these cases, the purpose of these agreements

is to

improve and

streamline the internal working relationships.

Partnering with community groups -- The policy of encouraging partnering among community
and institutional groups, construction contractors, CA/T management, and
has resulted in

MHD

benefits to mitigation. Since the mitigation measures are included in the construction cost estimate

and bidding packages, there has been agreement in advance which has reduced the level of potential
major change orders and claims. Some major contractors have been exceptionally receptive to
working with community groups to accommodate complaints and maintain good will without
holding up a contract or putting in immediate change orders.

If this pattern

continues,

it

will help

cost containment efforts.

Construction contractors interviewed for this study indicated they

felt

they were dealt with fairly as
cases, a contractor

may

not have liked the resulting decision or agreement, the opportunity to state his case was there.

We

a result of the application of

CA/T's partnering

policy. Although, in

some

were told by several contractors that all disputes had been settled without resorting to litigation. With
over twenty five percent of the dollar value of construction completed to date, the fact that no dispute
has gone to litigation is important.

There are some

among

who

argue that partnering agreements, while promoting cooperation and progress

contractors, are being accomplished

by CA/T management leaning towards over generous

claims settlements and that the project might be better off in terms of overall cost
claims were litigated

17
.

There

is

some concern

Some

within

CA/T management

if

some

contractor

as to whether partnering

However, given the
litigation on
one contract could have on related interlinked construction, it is too soon to tell whether the
partnering approach is causing unnecessary cost escalation. So far, progress is made and
disagreements are amicably resolved so that construction is proceeding with minimal delay.
does result

in

additional cost.

believe the relationship

essential priority of the overall project schedule and the

is

too relaxed.

problems that delays caused by

CA/T management estimates that a one day delay of a contract on the critical path is a setback
worth approximately $800,000 to the owner. According to both management and the
on the partnering arrangements plays a key role in preventing
delays by avoiding job stoppages. It helps with the essential goal of the CA/T program to
complete critical jobs on or ahead of schedule.
contractors, the priority put

Some
"I

senior

don't like

it.

management personnel of other Boston area
it's

like letting the contractor put his

hands

in

authorities are

known

to have their reservations about Partnering.

One commented,

your pockets."
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2.

Change order

policy

Reducing the rate of change orders (expressed as a percentage of original contract bid value)
represents the largest potential for costs savings within the CA/T project. With remaining
construction amounting to about $4.0 billion, a reduction of change order costs of just from one
half of one to one percent would mean potential saving of from $20 to $40 million.

management has

above the contract bid price
1996 Finance Plan and has been approved by the FHWA. It
represents an important reduction from the 24% that the project experienced on some of its earlier
construction contracts. In response to concerns expressed by oversight agencies and to reflect the
Project

of 10.7%. This target

current project

management

to

is

established a target for change order allowances

reflected in the

management effort on cost containment,
focus on these issues. 18

a task force has been created by project

There are two major causes for change orders;

Unanticipated

•

site

conditions

— a major problem in the areas where underground excavation

and tunnel construction plans are being implemented in downtown Boston in the areas that were

once

part of the harbor

and subsequently

filled in

and loaded with

utility lines

of different

sorts.

Unanticipated mitigation measures — particularly those requested by agencies, businesses
and community groups to protect adjacent streets and neighborhoods from noise, dust and

•

vehicular and pedestrian traffic hindrances during the construction process.

While the extensive planning and engineering work anticipated most of these problems, which were
reflected in cost estimates

construction process

is

and subsequent contract bids, there

will inevitably

be changes once the

underway.

There are a number of measures suggested by project management

by contractors, and others
experienced with Massachusetts construction laws and practices, that can be examined and
implemented by project management and others to help reduce the impact on the project budget by
change orders.

18

The task force includes

and the

the senior

managers

in

staff,

charge of construction for the Joint Venture, along with representatives of

MHD and FHWA

MHD Director of Design and the Construction Contract Administration Manager.
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A

"deductible" for change orders

To date the CA/T project has processed about 3,000 change orders. Of these, 91% have involved sums
of less than $250,000, and half of these less than $15,000.

account for
of the

total

money

most of the
change order

The

involved.

9%

A

relatively

few large change orders

of change orders over $250,000 account for

84%

cost.

Processing change orders involves costs not only to the project management staff but to the contractor
as well,

and delays can hold up the overall project schedule.

19

Eliminating the processing of smaller

change orders (of $25,000 or less) could eliminate a significant portion of processing expense. By
raising the limit to $100,000 (which represents about one-fifth of one percent of a typical CA/T
contract), much more processing cost could be saved. This could be done by advertising future
contracts with a clause which would make the contractor liable for the first $100,000 of any change
order. The requirement would not only avoid processing costs but also provide an incentive for the
contractor to perform the actual

for less. Change orders are now paid for on a pre-determined
and are almost always completed before changes are finally

work

cost of time and materials basis

20

approved. Switching to a fixed cost for the smaller changes should create pressure
quickly and efficiently and avoid problems caused by approval procedures. If

to get the

job done

some protection

is

needed for contractors with this procedure, a larger deductible of, say, $ 100,000 could be limited only
to those claims initiated by the contractor himself. The claims for changes initiated by the "owner"
could be limited to a smaller amount, say $25,000. It would also be possible to set a dollar limit on
the absolute number of owner-initiated claims to which the exemption applies (for example, one claim
for every $2.5 million of contract value). It is important that the deductible amount, at whatever level,
be subtracted from the amount paid on all claims, including those that exceed the
there is no incentive to elevate, for example, a $90,000 claim to $101,000.

There are unconfirmed reports

set limits, so that

Department of Defense has been experimenting with this
case, all claims for changes up to 1% of total contract value are

that the U.S.

approach with some success. In their

CA/T project, it is possible that some legislation may
CA/T project management is working on specific proposals

absorbed by the contractor. In the case of the

39N of Chapter 30).

be required (section

19 One

CA/T

resident engineer visited by our

team bad 92 change orders

to date in bis project, of

$300,000 on what will be a $70 million job. The remaining 27 were valued

and the small claims were not

20

in proportion to the

The use of pre-determined

sums

at

which 73 were contractor

initiated

which amounted

to less

than

about $5.0 million. However, the time and effort required to process both the large

involved.

unit costs for required changes has generally been popular with the construction contractors for

a contract with a good notion of how much they can be paid for unanticipated changes. However, there

is

often

it

allows them to bid

a great deal of complexity

in auditing

some incentive for contractors to under bid the unit costs of items they think will be used in smaller quantities
than contained in the office estimates. If more quantity is needed, the argument is for "changed conditions" and unit prices in excess of those bid are
sought This situation undercuts the "ease of administration" rationale for unit cost changes. The use of unit cost requires the contractor's honest
application of the unit price provision. In many contracts bid as lump sum (L.S.), it is often necessary for the owner to go back to the low bidders and
request unit prices to help the owner when making progress payments. In contracts bid with unit prices, bids submitted using unusually high or low
the quantities involved, and there

unit prices in

hopes of making a

is

"killing" are

termed "unbalanced bids".

It is

case the Section Designer - to detect this "unbalance" and to reject the bid

honest unit prices are easier to administer and end up saving

money

usually the responsibility of the office reviewing the bid prices -

when

it

in this

appears purposely designed to "make a killing." Contracts bid with

for the owners.
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in this

regard which

we

believe should be given support.

Unit pricing generally saves time and effort in processing change orders by making it an up
front element of the contract bid. The deductible concept should be tested before being applied
across the board.

Other administrative measures

There are other measures noted by project management, construction contractors, and others which
could improve the change order process. These include the following:

•

Strengthening contract language — by stating contractor responsibility with more precision,
removing clauses related to general desires and not to specific results, and consolidating
sections with overlapping requirements. This language

management based on experience and should help

•

reviewed annually by project

is

tighten the change order process.

"No damages for delay" ~ The standard CA/T contract allows for the recovery of additional
by the "owner" (MHD). While Massachusetts
law allows public agencies to include clauses which allow contractors to have additional time
for delays not caused by them, but without more money, this provision has not yet been used
by CA/T. Given that the project now has a track record of experience on which to build
contractual requirements, this type of provision might well be considered.
money,

•

as well as time, for those delays caused

Optimizing the benefit from contractual provisions
Force

is

- The

Change Order Task
undertake more stringent

project's

tightening the directions given to resident engineers to

enforcement of material, technical, and safety requirements of specifications and to ensure that
contractors are meeting their required quality control responsibilities, as well as notice of

claims, proposal submissions, and
instructed to consider "the

document requirements.

In this context, they have been

most reasonable" interpretation of contract provisions, rather than

to accept, in general, the contractor's position if

contractor's position will be

done

if it is the

it

was

reasonable.

Now

accepting the

"most reasonable" interpretation of a specific

provision of the contract.

•

Improve the independent assessment process —
a change order proposal

is

worth

rests

In the final analysis, the estimate of

with the independent assessment prepared by the

what

CA/T

project control staff. However, the Field Contract Administrator also prepares an assessment.

In instances our team had a chance to review, the assessment

coming from

the Field

Administrator (often with better knowledge of the specific situation) was about twice as high
as that of the independent assessment. This situation

makes

it

difficult for the project to

have

a unified position vis-avis the contractor in final negotiations over the change order value.
Clarification of the

communications links

in this procedure should help the quality of the

resulting decisions.
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Simplify paperwork requirements ~ In our discussions with contractors, one consistent
complaint involved the volume of paperwork they were required to prepare to document
change order requests. To contractors, it appears that there are too many people in project

•

management required

handle and sign off on change orders. Project management

to

is

currently taking steps to improve this situation, to reduce costs both to the contractor and

management. One of the construction contractors interviewed said that he was
"drowning in overhead." He stated that on one specific job he had to add thirty (30) persons
to his staff to handle the paperwork and manage the interchange of schedules, meetings, etc.
that he or others on his staff were required to attend or participate in to meet contract
requirements. These are thirty persons who do not do any of the required construction work,
but do only the required paperwork called for under the contract.
project

3.

The Value Engineering Change Proposals

Policy

During the period of the work on final engineering design from 1991 through 1995, project
management also instituted another cost reduction technique called "value engineering". This method
required final design engineers to hold to a specific construction budget once their designs have

reached

75%

completion, then submit the designs to a peer review panel which reviews them for

possible cost reduction. Project

close to

$500 million

21

management claims that this process produced important savings of

in the specifications for the construction

Table 3.3

-

Design Phase
Construction Phase

3.3).

Savings from Value Engineering To Date

Total Savings

No. of

Value Engineering

packages (See table

Recommendations

$K

27

477,880

63 (to date

13,000

)

490,880

Total

In the construction phase, Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECPs) provide an
opportunity for the construction contractor to submit ideas for cost savings and for
acceleration of a construction project, and to share in the cost savings with the

50 basis. To be effective, a VECP program must be fair and
comprehensive in its review and speedy in its execution. According to the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, a good VECP program should be capable of realizing an overall savings of 6
to 8 percent of the project construction cost. With $4 billion in construction remaining to be
put in place, savings can amount to more than $200 million dollars, half of which would be

Commonwealth,

often on a 50

-

returned to the owner (MHD).

21
It

should be noted that a number of the oversight agencies including the Commonwealth's Inspector General and the Federal

CA/T

value engineering program, claiming that more savings might have been achieved for the
had been adopted before construction contracts were let.

critical

of the

Commonwealth

GAO have been

if

more

VE proposals
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There are

a

number of important

By submitting

•

a

VECP,

characteristics of this procedure:

a construction contractor expects the

approving a modification

in the project specifications,

owner

will consider

construction materials and/or

techniques with the belief that such changes will improve the overall project, reduce costs
and possibly speed the completion of work.

Construction contractors can profit both in time and in dollars by submitting and executing
workable VECP proposals. VECPs can enhance a construction contractor's reputation

•

when, having submitted one or more executable VECPs he/she shows superior
construction skills, higher productivity and a creative approach to constructing
and produces a

While there

•

is

better,

no

more durable

facility

with lower

real opposition in principle to

potential for professional friction in

its

cycle costs.

an effective

execution.

plans and specifications can be embarrassed

life

when

facilities

VECP program,

there

is

the

The Section Designers who develop
a

section design did not anticipate the solution in the

VECP raises the question
There

of

why

the

always the
possibility that VECPs will point out a limited and unimaginative design approach and/or a
reluctance of a design firm to accept new design and construction approaches. If good
first

place.

is

VECPs

are rejected for these reasons, then the project and the owner suffer and incur the
burden of the costs which could have been saved, the time that could have been saved, and
the improved quality of the facility that could have been constructed.

Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) managers report that, with about one quarter of construction

VECP savings on 63 VECPs submitted through March

contracts completed to date, overall
total

,1997,

about one half of one percent (or about $13 million). This relatively low amount of savings

was explained

in interviews

with representatives of construction firms and officials from the

Construction Industries of Massachusetts (CIM); they attributed the poor recovery to problems and

complaints

proposals to the
illustrate the

proposal

is

22
makeup and procedure of the VECP program. Contractors submit preliminary
Resident Engineer outlining the idea (with as many drawings as necessary to

to the

proposed change) and the potential cost savings.

may

worth further consideration, he

construction contractor or,

proposed change, he

if

he

may send

unable to

feels

it

on

ask that the

make

to a higher level

If the

VECP

Resident Engineer believes a

be developed further by the

a preliminary evaluation of the merit of the

of review.

Usually, the latter process applies. If the higher level of review sees the worth of the proposal,
the construction contractor can enter into an agreement with project

management for sharing
some cases, costs

design and other costs necessary to prepare a fully developed submission or, in

may

be paid fully by project management. However, the amount of detail required, according to
number of times that additional information is requested by the review team,

contractors, and the
is

so great that

much

precious time can be consumed

operation while evaluation proceeds.

"

-

and the contractor cannot stop his

23

CA/T VECP procedures were criticized earlier by the

its report "Value Engineering Change
Highway Department, through its Project Manager issued Revision 5 to the CA/T
"Project Procedures No. 1213." Because there was an interactive exchange of findings and recommended actions between the IG and the Project
Office, the Project Procedure (PP) was issued and became effective on June 6, 996 before the IG report actually was distributed. Although this

Proposals: dated December, 1996.

As

Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General (IG) in

a result, the Massachusetts

1

Project Procedure corrected

many of the older problems

with the

VECP program, the system remains complicated and is not yet completely effective
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Some contractors believe that section design representatives on the evaluation and review team often
VECP because it may reflect poorly on the section designer. " If it was any good
it would have been included in the plans and specifications" and, " it will embarrass us if we go along
with it because we didn't think of it" is what construction contractors believe underlies prolonged
hesitate to approve a

In

VECP committees.

Sometimes the concern

is

understandable, especially

a section designer has no experience in the area where a change

is

proposed.

reviews and rejections by

when

some cases,
it

.

section designers have been accused of deliberately changing plans and specifications

and issuing change orders when a
thus render

u

no longer

viable.

particular part of the design

VECP has been submitted so as to avoid approving the VECP, and

The excuse

and

now

usually

is that

the designer

was never happy with

has had the opportunity to correct

it.

that

This deprives the

contractor of his share of the savings, and also eliminates any potential savings for the State.

To

turn a

VECP program

an effective

money

which looks, "great

Encourage the submission of

•

in the written regulations, but

poor

in execution" into

saving measure requires the following actions:

VECPs by

simplifying the

VECP

submission and evaluation

procedure.

Reduce the number of personnel on the review panel and

•

have authority
•

to

approve or reject the

insure that review board

members

VECP.

Use

the engineering resources in the project

new

techniques or material proposed by the

management team to obtain expertise quickly in
VECP when the review board is lacking in these

areas.

VECP submission can be evaluated in 30 days to insure that a contractor has
the opportunity to implement the VECP without unduly delaying other parts of the contract.

•

Insure that any

•

Sensitize project
for rejecting a

management to insure that designer pride and embarrassment are not reasons

VECP.

23

Construction contractors say

VECP.

that, in

VECP had to be

the benefits of their

management

to disregard the

VECPs have been

lost in the

time necessary for

management to review the

VECP that was in the review process; "we (the construction contractor) are

when the contractor proceeds with his construction contract beyond the point where the
beyond this point some of the new construction must be removed before the proposed change can be started; consequently
proposed change is lost. One contractor indicated that he intends to avoid submission of VECPs through the remainder of his

no longer interested

in

pursuing the change." This happens

initiated;

the benefit of the

contract because he has at least seven
the

many cases,

Contractors have frequently told

number of people involved

VECPs that have taken 6 months to a year or more to evaluate. Another construction contractor, commenting on
claimed that many of the personnel involved had little authority to approve or reject the proposal under

in the review,

He claimed that where he has seen an effective VECP program, it has been conducted speedily and efficiently with a review and evaluation
team of not more than eight (8) persons, each of whom had the necessary authority to move the proposal along. He said, "everybody knows that you can
make progress more quickly with a committee of 5 or 6 persons rather than a committee of 20 to 30."

consideration.
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In

one of the VECPs submitted, the section designer apparently had no experience

in

"The

New Austrian Tunneling Technique;" however, both

joint venture firms participated in demonstration

programs sponsored by the Department of Transportation on the Harvard Square Red Line extension
in the 1970-80's where the applicability of the tunneling technique was proven. This is a case where the Project Management could have stepped in.
and with their firms' superior knowledge of this relatively new construction technique, assumed the expert's role and quickly approved or rejected
the procedure submitted.
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From our

discussions with project

current practices involving the

management and

VECP program

is

it appears that a review of\
Within the partnering policy of

contractors,

in order.

CA/T, a group composed of members from project management, section design teams, and
construction contractors should meet quickly to resolve problems or misunderstandings
involving VECP submissions so that contractors' faith in an honest, fair and speedy review of

Some

a proposal could be restored.

VECP

construction contractors

might again submit timely and cost saving ideas on

who vowed never

this project.

to submit another

.

C. Environmental assistance
In

conforming

to the legal

and regulatory requirements of federal and

state

CA/T project has uncovered a number of areas in which assistance from

environmental laws, the

the environmental regulatory

agencies could help contain and reduce construction costs without violating commitments

conform

to applicable

discussions with project

Review process

1.

made

to

laws and regulations. Three of these have come to our attention through

management and

contractors:

relief

There are a number of actions required after required permits have been received for construction
which may not be necessary to insure proper environmental protection. However, they impact the
construction schedule which is the critical concern at this time. These include notifications of minor
project changes over

which there

is

confusion as to the applicability of

management

required under coastal zone

MEPA regulations, reviews

regulation already included in other agency's reviews,

of air quality regulations, exemption of large scale projects from

flexibility in the application

inapplicable wetlands and waterways regulations, streamlining the surface water quality permit

process, and others.
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Use of these regulations

to create often frivolous appeals

problems in maintaining the construction schedule projects, including the

can cause great

CA/T

program, with

consequent additional costs.
2. Soil

handling definitions

Construction contractors working on the

CA/T program have been

handling "contaminated" soil which is excavated from construction
if

used as

fill

when

"uncontaminated"
the

same

tunneling construction

fill

for an

underground

sites,

but then

is

"decontaminated"

completed. They point out that their need to provide

site in

which the leaching process of adjacent soil provides

level of "contaminants" as the soil extracted is not particularly efficient. Since the sites are

underground, the higher quality soils for
Contractors believe that

perform

is

delayed by requirements for

at

lower

cost.

more

fill

are not necessary for environmental protection.

functional definitions of soil qualities and their use

would help them

This appears to be an appropriate issue for study by the agencies involved.

These issues are discussed in

detail in a letter

and memorandum

to the Assistant Secretary

of the Executive

Office of Administration and Finance by the General Counsel of the Executive Office of Transportation and

Construction of December 11, 1996 concerning Executive Order 384.

52

3.

Additional landfill

sites

Since the handling of excavated material from the CA/T tunneling operations has become a larger and

management needs the assistance
~
of the environmental agencies
in locating sites for additional landfill
both state and federal
There could be significant savings available to the project if the Department of
operations.
Environmental Protection can develop procedures which encourage lower bids on the disposal of
more

difficult logistical issue than originally anticipated, project

materials to allow for the depressed Artery roadway. Possible savings are in the order of $5 to

$30

million.

Soil displaced during the construction of the Artery

is

historic

fill

— material put into the harbor over

expand downtown Boston. While this material is not a hazardous waste, it is not
There are a variety of sites where the material would be useful and safe,
particularly if some kind of cap is put over it. For example, it could be used under a roadway, or, as
proposed for golf courses, used to convert a flat area to one with gentle rolls and interesting contours,
capped, with grass growing above the cap. Because the material does contain some contaminants,
case-by-case review of proposed sites would be more acceptable than blanket approvals in advance.
The Artery will run out of existing disposal capacity in August, meaning that the first of the disposal
contracts must be put out to bid in June. Estimates of the cost for disposal at in-state locations is
roughly $20 per cubic yard, while out-of-state disposal may cost about fifty percent more ($30 per
100 years ago

to

exactly pollution-free.

cubic yard). Since approximately 4.7 million cubic yards are involved, using in-state sites could yield
savings of up to $25 to $30 million.

The chief

Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) site approval process (which in the past has ranged from several months up to
several years). An accelerated review process or even pre-approval of a few existing landfills could
obstacle to realizing these potential savings is

in the

provide potential bidders with the assurance that there will be a quick, reliable process for approval
of additional in-state

may

sites.

The

inter-agency staffing agreement between the

already be sufficient to cover the cost of additional

CA/T

project and

DEP staff for this purpose.

DEP

u

D. Other Measures
1.

Police details

Police details are a significant cost to the
cost to-date

is

over $22 million and

is

CA/T project,

expected to

is borne by the state alone. The
$75 million by the end of the project

a cost which

total nearly

in late 2004.

Some

presence

is

required to direct traffic around the

many

construction sites of the project.

Professional police are used in Massachusetts while, in other jurisdictions, flagmen or

expensive method of handling construction

Opposition to expedited decision making on disposal

sites

traffic is

used.

from the environmental community

approval process as a safeguard against possible abuse, or parties with business before
requests might further lengthen delays in dealing with their

would
save

likely allude to fears that the state

money on

the

CA/T

own

is likely.

DEP who feared

potential savings and

would

Groups who viewed the lengthy

that

projects might voice particular objections.

would be influenced by the

some other less

expedited action on Artery project
Arguments against expedited action

sacrifice environmental protection in order to

project.
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Project

management has negotiated an arrangement with

the City of Boston and

its

police unions

which requires a sergeant with every two patrolmen— the sergeant stands a post for each CA/T site
with the detail work centralized under a captain. This is a compromise from the usual system that
would have had a sergeant for each three patrolmen, and every two sergeants requiring a captain. The
latter would have cost over $120 million. The compromise first meant a cost estimate of about $80
million. The estimate has been further reduced to about $75 million through a better understanding
of construction staging.

Management argues
construction
situation.

site.

that

an urban environment requires a professional police presence

Moreover, they argue, flagmen cannot act

wage

away. The federal government used
After

of these costs.
responsible for

2.

(sic)" is

not always true,

that,

structures and overhead, their cost "approaches" those of the professional detail.

Others would argue that flagmen costs
far

a

in a remedial or preventative traffic

Thus, they conclude that the "myth that flagmen are cheeper

with union

at

some

full costs.

may approach

those of a professional detail, but they are

to participate fully in sharing, but gradually

controversy, there

was voluntary agreement

reduced

that the state

its

still

share

would be

'

Insurance Program

The CA/T's

risk

management or insurance program

is

one of the success

stories of the project thus far.

on a successful and effective safety program, luck, and good owner-contractor relationships the
is expected to realize substantial credits by project's end.

Built

insurance program

The Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) undertook a risk assessment in 1991 to determine
how to manage and insure the project's risks until completion. Its decision was to undertake an ownerowned or wrap-up insurance program in 1992 that they believe would be easier to manage, more
productive and more cost effective than insurance purchased by each contractor and sub-contractor.

The insurance program includes six different coverages; the largest and most expensive are Workmen's
Compensation (WC) and General Liability (GL). The former covers workers and the latter third
parties. The two programs account for about 90% of the premiums paid with WC responsible for about
two-thirds of premiums.

premium payments from 1992 to the end of the project are expected to total about $780 million;
$300 million has been paid to date. The actual or net cost of the program by project's end
should be about $150 million, however, provided current projected loss ratios and other assumptions

Total

close to

are realized.

Current loss
of

55% and

GLloss

ratios, a

the

ratio is

The state makes
trust

premium payments, are far below the expected loss ratio
initial policy was based. Current WC loss ratio is 30% and the

function of losses and

75% upon which

the

12%.
regular

premium payments

into a trust fund designed to cover anticipated losses.

fund has two loss accounts that are used

earned on these accounts
recently established,

is

is

pay claims filed during construction. Annual interest
and the insurance carrier. A third account,
retained earnings account into which is transferred MHD's share of
to

shared equally between

MHD's

The

MHD

annual interest generated by the two loss accounts.
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The retained earnings account is expected to total about $350 million by 2005. Retention of that
amount and its successful investment until 2018 when the claims period should end is projected to
generate about $600 million.
It

should be pointed out, however, that the current loss experience has taken place in a period when

only about

downtown

30%

of construction has been completed.

construction with

its

Remaining

is

the

complex and

from the expected $600 million. For the project to realize its optimistic scenario, it will have
up the intensity of the safety program and continue to enjoy the same degree of luck.
3.

Approval of plans for

difficult

higher risks. Higher loss ratios would lower the program savings
to ratchet

vertical construction

Chapter 1 1 of the Acts of 1997, adds CA/T vertical construction to the definition of capital facilities
which are exempted from the Division of Capital Planning and Operation (DCPO) jurisdiction.

DCPO has the statutory authority to review and approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for
all

public building construction by the state.

Specifications are such that the buildings

The items included in each section of the Plans and
which contain them are generally termed "Vertical

Construction," or buildings generally intended to be occupied.

authorized under Chapter 30 of the General

commonly, highway or heavy

Laws termed

This contrasts with construction

"Horizontal Construction" or

construction.

The CA/T Project contains a number of facilities which can be classified
which normally would come under the jurisdiction of the DCPO. These

-The
-The
-The

more

as vertical construction and
are:

ventilation buildings

parking garage

(at

Parcel 7) which has retail space at grade and

some

office space.

operation and control center

--The back-up to the operation and control center

—The toll plaza
-Emergency Stations (4 each) where tow trucks are
-The central maintenance facility in South Boston
-The satellite maintenance facility
-One or two electrical sub-stations

~A visitors'

in readiness

center on Spectacle Island

DCPO has the statutory authority to control and supervise the planning, design and construction
of public buildings, except for projects which the Legislature has exempted from DCPO jurisdiction.

The

The DCPO and the Department of Public Works (DPW), now the Massachusetts Highway Department
(MHD), developed an agreement in August 1990 in which the two agencies agreed to certain inter-

MHD

agency procedures certificating of planning (within 21 days), approving of the
procurement
procedure for the selection of a final designer, management of the final design (within 2 1 days) and
resolution of disagreements (within 10 to 15 days). The plans and specifications cannot be advertised
until

they are approved.
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In 1994, Section

of Chapter 102 of the Acts of 1994 (the Transportation

1 1

jurisdiction over design ot the

CA/T

Bond Bill), specified

MHD

project ventilation of buildings, utility facilities and toll booths

subject to prior review by the Inspector General.

The 1996 transportation bond bill expanded the IG's responsibility to include review of construction
as well. The Inspector General has since conducted reviews of a number of facilities (See IG
publication: "Statutorily Mandated Reviews of Central Artery/Tunnel Projects Building Construction
Contracts" dated December 1996), and concentrated on:
--Cost Containment

-Cost and Design Changes

-Change Orders/Value Engineering
-Mitigation Agreements

-Federal Funding
In effect,
It

DCPO has

would appear

CA/T construction while the Inspector General (IG) does.
may have neither the number nor the variety of engineering
and approve plans and specifications for the CA/T project. The Inspector

no role

that the

in

IG's staff

personnel needed to review

General's responsibility and expertise

and preventing fraud, waste and abuse
while the DCPO's is in planning, engineering, design and construction. Thus, it appears that the
Inspector General's office has been assigned a responsibility in an area where it may not be qualified
to

is in

the area of detecting

perform.

CA/T management should
Inspector General's

and

specifications

new

evaluate the impact of this transferred authority to ensure that the

authority does not additionally delay the review

and therefore slow down the completion of the CA/T

and approval of plans

project.

SUMMARY OF COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION ISSUES IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS
As we have discussed, there are a variety of measures which are being and could be applied to
help in containing and reducing CA/T costs during the intense period of construction now
underway. These are summarized in Table 3.4. While many of the most important measures
are the responsibility of CA/T management, others will require the active support and
cooperation of the Legislature and other state and local agencies. With each area of potential
cost reduction having a "constituency" whose interest may be affected by any change in existing
practice, there is no guarantee that implementing any or all these measures will be easy.
Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the Commonwealth and its taxpayers to see that as many of
these measures as possible can be tried, tested, and implemented as the program moves ahead.
Without a cooperative effort on the part of all the "parties at interest," including a more active
role on the part of the Legislature to monitor and assist in the process, the potential for increased
project costs will be high.
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.

Table 3.4

SUBJECT

-

SUMMARY OF CA/T CONSTRUCTION COST ISSUES
FINDINGS

POTENTIAL COST
SAVINGS

Concerns with the small
number of bidders on

Not easy to determine,
bat could be a problem

RECOMMENDATION

BID POLICY

Bidders

list

expansion

Bid acceptance

large contracts

and the

procedures for
accepting bids varying

from

with

Monitoring of bidding
process

required to

is

new bids higher

than office estimates

determine

if

action

is

needed

office estimates

A-B bid procedure

Legislation needed to

Filed sub-bid exemption

take advantage of

Limited but possibly

Proposed

important

justified

legislation is

and allows CA/T to

experiment with these
approaches

possible cost savings

CONTRACT ADM'N
Partnering Policy

Change Order Policy

VECP Policy

Could range from

3%

These should be the
most effective way to
control or reduce costs

to

as the large

effective handling of

construction contracts

these techniques

4%

of remaining

contract values with

Streamline review and

approval system-

Experiment with
"deductible" for change

orders

~ Encourage

submission of VECPs

are let

ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSISTANCE
Review relief

Construction process

is

Savings in

soil

Cooperation from

DEP and

uncovering problems

handling policy could

other relevant agencies

Soil definitions

which cause additional

make a substantial

should be encouraged

Additional landfill sites

cost

difference in costs to

complete

OTHER MEASURES
Police details

These costs have been
disallowed

by the

FHWA for Federal
funds participation, so
that the State has to

Millions

now spent on

this function,

which

has strong support

from the Police unions,
could be reduced

pick up these costs

Insurance Program

Wrap-around program
has played an
important role in
keeping

CA/T budget

Legislation is required to

change police

—

details policy

reexamination of

Legislature's position

suggested.

Very large potential

Monitoring of insurance

budget saving are

claim experience suggested

evident with low

to determine future action.

accident experience

on target
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CHAPTER 4 - COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The

cost of managing the design and construction of the Central Artery /Tunnel project has been a

prominent part of the overall budget. About $ 2.6

billion,

or over

25%

of the budget, has been allocated

27

Because of the tremendous size and scope of the project, it was decided early on
and construction process could not be handled by the MHD, the agency normally
responsible for managing highway building projects in the Commonwealth. As a result, the assistance
to these functions.
that the design

of an outside construction management firm was sought through the competitive bidding process. In
1985, the Joint Venture of the Bechtel Corporation, one of the world's largest and most reputable
construction

management

firms,

and Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade and Douglas, a large engineering firm

with extensive experience in tunneling projects
project

management ever

in

urban areas, was selected and has been responsible for

since.

From 1988 through mid 1996 (which was the intense period of engineering of the project), the total cost
of the design and management services averaged over $20 million a month, or 43% of the total project
costs incurred during this period.

This expenditure, while large, bought the project the hundreds of

required approvals from environmental and funding agencies, the agreements on
to be built

and mitigation measures to be included

some observers

feel this

in the design

how

the project

was

and construction bid packages. While

amount of design and management expenditure was excessive, others viewed
all the complicated engineering and community related mitigation issues the

as necessary to resolve

it

project engendered.

Table 4.1 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN COSTS THROUGH MID 1996
PROJECT FINAL DESIGN
COMBINED DESIGN AND
PROJECT MANAGEMENT

MANAGEMENT

(includes preliminary design)

$1,300
$ 12.04
Source:

M-

1988

M/month

to

$ 800

1996

for 108

mo.

M

-

1989

$ 8.33 M/month

to

1996

for

S 2,100

96 mo.

S 20.36

M

-

1988 to 1996

M/month

for

96 mo.

MHD financial plan of 9/96 and summary project master schedule

The MHD financial plan of September 1996 estimated that $506 million would be required in the
management budget for the period June 1996 to January 2000, and $179 million for final design
activities (principally for surface restoration
is

complete). This final design

work

is

management costs will be used mainly

27

of the Artery and connections once the tunnel construction

scheduled to be completed before the end of 1997. The

to supervise construction contractors as they

move through

the

This figure includes SI. 632 billion for the Joint Venture which covers both the preliminary engineering design work and

management of both

the design and construction process along with $1,028 billion for final section designs carried out

other engineering contractors under the supervision of the Joint Venture. This
resources. Other

mega

projects, admittedly less

is

complicated than the "Big Dig", have been able

smaller allocation for engineering design and project management. For example, of the
required to construct the Denver International Airport, roughly only

$300

management team which included

a

number of

it is

the City's

to

total cost

million, or about

purchase the services of outside project management and design firms. However,
created an integrated project

by

a significant allocation of total project

10%

be completed with a

much

of close to S3.0 billion

of the total

was needed

to

important to point out that Denver

own employees working

side by side

with the outside contractors.
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The CA/T management

building process

report of January, 1997, however, indicates an estimated

management budget requirement of $ 638 million for the period up to the year 2000 28 The $638
million includes an amount of $210 million needed beyond 1999. ( Appendix A, P. 17)
.

As

the project

moves

into its final construction stages,

supervision to explore the possibilities for functions

it

will be important for those responsible for

now planned

for the

management

its

consultant to

be absorbed by the agencies which will have ultimate responsibility for operating the system,
the MHD and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. With the passage of the
Metropolitan Highway System legislation, the Turnpike Authority will be thrust into a new and
expanded role in the transportation picture of the region, a role that will require a major
transformation of the agency into a first class system provider with expanded scope and quality
particularly

of operations. In

this context, the

opportunity to transfer

We

some of

the

expanded

have made a preliminary assessment of

staffing structure

and the

MHD should provide the

to these agencies as appropriate.

this potential for cost

savings by reviewing the costs,

in the current work plan (Work Order 14) as well as the
The results of this review are presented for possible
management and the appropriate agencies, not as definitive

and functions contained

Management Plan of

Project

role of the Authority

CA/T management functions

12/31/96.

by project
recommendations at this stage.

exploration

The contract for management services, which includes both the Joint Venture and their subcontractors,
has three elements of cost: direct costs, which are essentially the salaries of the employees working

on the

overhead

project; indirect or

contract

is 1

1%

of the total of

costs;

all direct

Joint Venture firms account for about

and a management

a function or position out of the

budget
the

to that

which

in the

CA/T

case of the

and indirect costs. In the current work plan, the services of the

85%

of the budgeted costs and subcontractors 15%. This work

plan covers about 900 staff positions covered by the
categories of possible savings; the

fee,

first is

management

contract. In general, there are

eliminating a function or position; the second

management

is

two

transferring

consultant's

of one of the state agencies, thereby reducing part of the overhead costs associated with

management

contract.

29

The overhead rate for the staff of the Joint Venture is in the neighborhood of 1 10%. If a position for
an employee with an annual salary of $60,000 is eliminated, the savings potential is over $145,000 per
year ($60,000 in direct costs plus close to $66,000 in indirect costs and a fee of $14,000). If the
position is transferred to a state agency, the savings might be in the order of $ 60,000 to $80,000 per

year depending on the amount of non-salary expense associated with the agency position. The annual
cost savings for a position with a salary of $75,000 are in the neighborhood of $ 175,000 if the position
is

eliminated entirely or up to $80,000 to $100,000

if

the position

is

transferred.

With

a

work

force

of about 900 people currently on the payroll of the Joint Venture, a reduction or transfer of from

An

additional

(the original

$244 million

end of the

for

project).

management costs has been

identified as

needed for the period from 2000

to

5%

2002

This amounts to a teal of over $800 million to close out the construction program.

While it can be argued that there are overhead costs associated with
same level as those associated with a private contractor.

state agencies, they are usually not at die
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10%, or just 45 to 90 positions, could engender important savings. The CA/T project management
team is currently working in this direction.
to

There are three areas of potential cost savings which should be explored by
1.

Duplication of functions

—

a situation where one part of the

Community relations activities -

management consultant

staff is

MHD or another state agency.

carrying out functions also being handled by another part or by

2.

CA/T management:

particularly those related to the ongoing functions of the

MHD

and the Turnpike Authority which will be responsible for operating the Metropolitan Highway System
when completed.
3.

Non-essential functions

—

particularly those

which may not be required

for project completion in

a cost containment environment.

1.

Duplication of functions

There appears to be some potential duplication of functions among various sections of the management
30
and
and other state agencies. Some
consultant's team, as described in the current work plan,
of these may be essential and justified, but others might be reviewed to determine whether some

MHD

overlap can be eliminated.

•

MHD

has a full time, experienced Right of Way Bureau. Given
Right of way activities - The
the relatively small amount of right of way activity left in the CA/T program, could this activity
be turned over to MHD? These activities include preparing preliminary plans, preparing
easements, spot takings, land management, and legislative support (See Work Order 14, page
5).

•

Geotechnical support —This
and construction
consultants? (See

•

activities,

is

provided for

in the

current

work

plan as a support to design

but does this overlap with the activities of area design and geotech

Work Order

14,

page 5)

Coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies

management consultant

--

The work plan

describes this as a

30 different agencies.
Is there some level of this coordination that might be handled as well or better by the staff of
EOTC or some other permanent agency? (See Work Order 14, page 7)
function of the

30

See

Work Order

14

-

in coordinating the activities of

page references as follow.
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Management

Fiscal

There

--

is

provision for a fiscal

management function within

the

management

consultant team. Since the development of funding strategies and coordination of
contract status are also carried on by EOTC and other branches of the state government, is this

function

still

management consultant?

required in the program of the

(

See

Work Order

page

14,

15)

Staff support functions

--

In the functions of the

management

consultant, there are

some

categories of support which might represent duplication. For example, there are positions for
a director of

included

EOTC.

communications and a director of media

in the staffing

Is

it

of other state

possible to

Both of these functions are
agencies, including the Turnpike Authority, MHD, and
relations.

combine and/or reassign some of these

activities to the

permanent

agencies, particularly since they are on- going functions of these agencies ?

management consultant need
Order

14,

to

have a legal

librarian

when

Does

the

MHD has a legal staff? (See Work

page 21)

Communication and contract administration

There is a function in the current work plan
Freedom of Information Act and audit information requests. There is also a
function for a communications/ records management responsible for documentation. Would it
be possible to combine the units responsible for these functions to save staff expense? There
-

for servicing the

is

a subcontracting unit in the

Procurement function and a contract administration

unit,

both

charged with relations with Joint Venture subcontractors. Could these functions be combined?

There
to

is

a Prime Contract Administrator as a stand-alone position

be administering the contract between

whose only function appears

MHD and the Joint Venture.

Is this

a function that

needs a separate position in light of the contract administration functions in the procurement

and contract administration units? (See

Construction management
processing

—

There

Project

is

Management

Plan, pages 31-33)

a construction support department responsible for

VECP proposals. The same role is performed in

the area construction managers. Is there

which could reduce

some overlap

There

staff costs?

is

part

by the resident engineers and

in these functions the elimination of

a technical support manager responsible for

forecasting, training, etc, .and a projects control group with responsibility for estimating,

scheduling and training. Are there

some savings

possible in this area?

(

See Project Management

Plan, page 36)

2.

Community

relations activities

While recognizing

that

community and

external relations are extremely important to ensuring the

when these activities should be transferred
from the CA/T management to the permanent agencies and consolidated with their ongoing functions.
Among the most important of these now handled under the management contract are:

successful completion of the project, there will be a time

•

Community outreach — The human
affirmative action and

resources function includes outreach activities for

community based

these organizations. (Work order

14,

organizations, along with the clearinghouse for

page 13)
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Community

•

and external

Community

•

relations

- The public

affairs activities

participation

affairs function covers extensive

(Work order

14,

page

~ The architectural

page

is

relations

19).

design services function,

involved in the planning for the reuse of land in
elevated Central Artery structure,

community

now

primarily

downtown Boston with the removal of the
management contract (Work order 14,

a function of the

5).

Small business assistance ~ This service, which includes technical assistance and
marketing, is also covered under the management contract (See Project Management Plan,

•

page

9).

In order to contain and reduce

MHD,

C A/T management costs in these areas, it should be possible for EOTC,

work out a scheme for absorbing some of these functions into
community relations and human resources operations in a way that would

and the Turnpike Authority

their existing public affairs,

to

help relieve the budget burden without affecting the overall performance of the

CA/T

construction

program.

3.

Non-essential functions

As

cutting the cost of

program management becomes a

priority as a cost containment/reduction

measure, there are other areas currently contained within the scope of the

management contract which

might be examined for their priority in the management budget. These include:

•

Temporary agency administration — The recruitment of temporary staff used by the project
is now handled by an outside contractor. With a downsized management operation, is it possible
to handle this function internally? (See

•

Work Order

14,

page 13)

Senior management functions — The activities of the Board of Control of the Joint Venture
are covered in the management budget. The positions of executive assistant and administrative
assistant to the

some

Program Manager are also covered. In a cost containment environment, are there

cost reduction potentials in these areas? (See Work Order

14,

page

19,

and Project Management

Plan, figure 5.2)

Use of large task forces

— We have noted

number of the participants in
the CA/T program of the use of relatively large task forces by project management to address
critical issues, solve problems and develop policy. While the use of task forces is essential to
good project management to provide broad perspectives on problem solving, for team building,
and for quick resolution of issues, the amount of time required by key staff to participate in large
the observations of a

meetings could detract from the performance of their primary functions. Without reducing the
substantial benefits gained
to prevent the

from the use of task forces, could

their size

and number be contained

poor use of key managers' time?
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CHAPTER 5 - FINANCING CA/T
While the
relatively

management contexts have remained
construction program of the CA/T program began in 1991, the

environmental, and transportation

political,

unchanged since the

financing context for the project has changed significantly.

During the time

was assumed

that the project

was being conceived,

Highway program was

the Interstate

to provide the basis for the funding. This

in effect

and

program provided federal government

reimbursement for 90% of the costs of construction for the parts of the projects on the Interstate system.

While most other
length of time

states

were able

to complete their elements of the

program before

took to plan and construct both the 1-90 and 1-93 segments of the

it

that Massachusetts could not

expiration, the

its

CA/T

project

meant

complete the construction before the termination date. The Intermodal

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which provided for the continuation of the use

of highway trust funds to finance the completion of interstate highways, was to end completely by the

mid

1990's.
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ISTEA

funding will expire at the end of the current federal fiscal year, September 30,

1997. Replacement legislation

now being

shaped

in

Congress, amid increased competition for limited

transportation funding from states in the south and mid-west,

is

unlikely to have as favorable a net

impact toward the Commonwealth. These changes in the federal funding climate are occurring just
as the project

is

about to undergo

its

and cash flow requirements

heaviest construction period

are about to peak.

highway funding formula adjustment is that the state may have
to pay a much larger proportion - possibly as much as 30% or 40% — of the cost for the
Artery/Tunnel than the 10% share anticipated when the project was initially funded.

The

likely result of the federal

Federal funds

1.

The major unknown
costs of the

variable in the current funding plan

CA/T project —

For FFY 97, the

last

is

what the

state

-

one that

is

crucial to

its

share of the future

can expect from the new federal highway

year of ISTEA, the state expects to receive about $650 million.

It

legislation.

has posited high,

middle or low federal funds scenarios for subsequent years ranging from over $800 million a year to

$450

The

million

battle

federal

3

1

from a new federal law.

over the

new

federal formula

is

waged between

highway taxes annually than they receive back

While providing

except for the

in

the donor states, those paying

highway

aid, ( i.e., Florida,

for increased Interstate Construction funding to reflect the costs of inflation in the

CA/T project,

provided that the states

1

980s,

ISTEA

more

in

Texas and

legislation recognized that,

Freeway project in Los Angeles, and a few others, the Interstate System was complete. The legislation
would receive instead what was in effect a block grant, based on a complex formula which would guarantee that states would
the Century

not suffer a steep decline in their annual

highway

trust

fund allocations while the legislation was

Massachusetts officials were not overly concerned with the
the U.S.

being

House of Representatives

stated in

its

ISTEA

report to the full

in force

through 1997. Because of

provisions in the early 1990's. However, as the Appropriations

House on

the U.S. Department of Transportation fiscal year

this provision.

Committee of

1997 appropriations

bill,

the Interstate Construction funds provided to the project in fiscal 1995. "are intended to be the final contributions for construction under the Interstate

program. Accordingly, Massachusetts must accept the risks associated with potential cost overruns and possible reductions
apportionment levels."

in future federal-aid
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other southern and mid-western states) and the donee states,
northeast states).

The

battle

Massachusetts,

(i.e.,

New York and

other

not expected to be resolved before the end of 1997 at the earliest.

is

Massachusetts has done very well under the current ISTEA, averaging $830 million a year in
total annual apportionment of about $ 18 billion. What everyone receives,

apportionment or 4.5% of the

is based on how much the Congress appropriates, which usually
apportionment amount.

however,
of the

There are several

now

in the

is

limited to close to

Congress, each with significant support. Step 21, a

90%

sponsored
by Senator Warner of Virginia and supported by 23 others, could have the most severe impact on
Massachusetts' federal highway allotment. It would produce an annual apportionment of $430 million,
bills

about 1.7% of the $ 22.5 to $25.5 billion national highway funding

double

whammy

effect, giving

total.

bill

Step 21 would produce a

Massachusetts a smaller proportion of a bigger

pie.

Another

bill,

sponsored by Senator Baucus of Montana and 16 others, called Stars 2000, would be similarly as

damaging

The

to

Massachusetts as Step 21.

President's bill and a

bill

offered by Senator Moynihan of

New York

and 33 co-sponsors

(1STEAII) offer the most for Massachusetts. The former would provide an annual apportionment of

$580 million, or 2.9% of a $20 billion total, while Moynihan's would provide a $656 million annual
apportionment or 2.7% of a total apportionment of $24.3 billion. Again, it is pointed out that actual
funds or obligations that would be available probably would be closer to 90% of the above figures.

The

recently passed balanced budget agreement only allows about $22.5 billion a year. (This could

reduce the state's apportionments particularly under Step 21 and ISTEAII). Should an even worse case

outcome than Step 21 result, the state would be forced to dig deeply into its tool bag of solutions,
among which could be increased funds from Mass Pike and possible shifting of highway funds from
non-CA/T projects, a concern of communities distant from the project.
2.

The 1997 State Transportation authorization

The state administration sought approval of a multi- billion dollar transportation bond bill to
cover the funding needs of the Central Artery Project, other federally-assisted statewide
improvements

in the State Transportation

Improvement Program (STIP), and non-federally-assisted

statewide transportation projects statewide at least through the 1999 federal fiscal year

September 30, 1999. The Legislature enacted the
Enactment of the legislation

CA/T construction

move

Allows

•

Helps keep the project on schedule to closure.

Allows the State

law

in

May

1997.

to

rapidly and on a timely basis.

to capture construction cost savings of

up

to

$250 from

the relatively

low current

inflation rate.
•

Responds

•

Makes

•

Provides

it

to the

FHWA's

ultimatum to disapprove future advance construction.

easier to cope with the expected cash flow or obligations deficit of 1998-2001.

some comfort

or

essentially:

•

•

bill in to

(FFY 99)

to the credit agencies.
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Sends a positive message

•

3.

Congress

to the

in its

development of a new federal highway formula.

The breakdown

The new law authorizes $3.0 billion for the CA/T project, of which $1.7 billion would be federal share
and $1.3 billion would be state share. Included in the state's share is an increased contribution to the
project from Mass Pike of $700 million. Some $100 million of the state's share is for CA/T project
costs that are not reimbursable.

The

federal share of $ 1.7 billion includes

$900 million which

the state will issue in the form of

GANS

or short-term grant anticipation notes.

While the amount of the bond
99, this

is

is

is

made.

Construction awards

Chapter
in

to be

only expected to service needs through FF Y
most sensitive, with major construction under way and

authorization

the schedule period that

major construction awards

4.

bill

1 1

of the Acts of 1997 responds to the need to fund the host of

1997 and 1998. According

87%

to the

CA/T construction

1996 Finance Plan, construction costs made up $4.8

contracts
billion or

of the project's overall to-go costs in 1996.

made in 1996. By the end of 1997, almost another
awards is expected to have been made; another $750 million is to be awarded in 1998.
Altogether, between $3.0 and $3.5 billion in construction will be under way from awards made in the
latter two years.

Some $908

million in construction awards were

billion dollars in

Timely construction awards will keep the overall schedule moving (the major element in keeping the
$10.4+ billion current project cost estimate from erupting). Failure to provide timely funds could
cause delay in contract awards which could bring about a ripple effect which would extend the project
schedule with

its

potential for increasing overall costs.

Award of the contracts at this time enables the state to capture the benefits of the currently low
inflation rate of 2.75%.

The $10.4 cost estimate

is built

on an

inflation rate of

3.35%. This 60 basis

point difference, together with the project's ability to go full bore on construction, represents up to

$250 million

in essentially

lower construction costs which

at best

would hold down the

overall project

cost and at worst offset unexpected cost increases.

Although there are

likely to

be future funding needs subsequent

to

FFY

'99, the light at the

end of the

tunnel should be shining at that time.

The law

also helps the state to deal with the obligations flow deficit of over $1.0 billion dollars
between 1998 and 2001. Between these years, costs are expected to exceed anticipated revenue from
the federal government while after 2001 those revenues are expected to exceed costs. Short-term

65

borrowing is authorized in anticipation of the post FFY 99 federal funding and would bridge the
gap with the law also providing state back-up for the short-term notes.

The law could serve
borrowing with
Finally, the

its

who

as a comfort to the credit agencies

deficit

dislike the intermittent project

uncertainty.

law responded

construction approvals

to the

ultimatum of the

would be made

and legislative options identified

in

FHW A which had notified the state that no advance

1997 unless third party agreements were finalized
the financial feasibility report of November 1996 were pursued.
after April 1,

Advance construction establishes future eligibility for federal funds, if and when they become
Because there is no obligation of federal funds at the time of advance construction approval
by the FHWA, the state has to have funding commitments for the full cost of each contract. As a

available.

prerequisite to
that

it

FHWA's concurrence

to

advance construction contracts, the

had sufficient cash, binding contracts with third

unencumbered

parties, (i.e.

Mass

state

had

Port and

legislative authority to cover total contract costs, exclusive of the

to

demonstrate

Mass Pike), and/or
amount of federal

funds actually obligated.

5.

Effect

The

on

state debt

state currently has three constraints

on the size of

its

debt load

—

two are

statutory,

one

is

administrative.

The

first

statutory constraint relates outstanding direct debt or general

predetermined figure.
increased

5%

direct debt limit

amount was

established in 1990 at $6.8 billion to be

a year. Thus, in fiscal 1996, the direct debt limit

debt at the close of

FY

because of the moving

The second

The

1996 was $8. 1

billion.

obligation debt to a

This restraint

is

was $8.7

billion.

Outstanding direct

not considered significant at this time

target.

no more than 10% of total budgeted
be 5.7% for FY 97. Thus, it also is not a

statutory restraint limits annual debt service to

expenditures. For

FY

meaningful restraint

96,

it

was 5.4% and

is

projected to

at this time.

The more meaningful restraint is the administrative policy that tries to limit the annual issuance of debt
to no more than $900 million. This has the effect of maintaining the annual debt load and debt
service relatively level since it tries to relate new bond issuance to bond retirement
6.

The

state's credit

While some believe such a large authorization might affect the state's credit rating, thereby increasing
its cost of bond issuance, others would argue that timing of the actual issuance is the more important
element of the credit equation, and certainly of the impact on the state's overall finances.
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The

aware of the

rating agencies are well

state's current

debt load and large future authorizations,

yet continue to rate the state highly.

September 1996, Fitch and Standard and Poor's
and called the state's outlook "positive" even while recognizing that considerable
transportation funding would be needed; Moody's rating was Al.
In rating the state's last general obligation issue in

rated

it

A+

economy has firmed and fiscal soundness has been restored, debt
and likely to remain so as considerable transportation needs remain to be funded."
Fitch said, "While the

high

is still

Moody's, in its fall 1996 report, said, "The Commonwealth's above average credit rating standing
acknowledges its restoration and maintenance of fiscal control in the years since 1991 and an
economy which generates high personal income and continues to expand. These credit strengths
are tempered by a heavy debt load, uncertainties regarding future debt requirements..."
Standard and Poor's in September 1996 also called the state's long-term outlook positive.
"significant capital needs will be addressed through debt issuance,

which

is

said,

It

expected to keep debt

Harbor Tunnel/Central Artery project, as well
as new funding for prisons and schools, could create additional expenditure and debt pressures. The
Commonwealth may need to make difficult choices between capital needs if it wishes to maintain
the already high overall debt burden at current levels and to remain within its self-imposed target
levels high. Potential additional costs for the Third

of maintaining future annual debt issuance at $900 million."

The

capital needs choices in

1997

may

not be as

difficult,

bond authorization

however, since the only other bond

$685 million

for court

house construction and reconstruction. However, choices in 1998 and thereafter would be

difficult.

authorization, besides the transportation

this year, is the

The credit agencies dislike uncertainty and surprises, and would be more comfortable with the
putting

its

project funding needs

up

State

front.

The plan behind the state bond authorization is sound and should keep the project moving on
schedule. Care must be taken to manage the issue to insure minimal impact on the state's
bond rating. The bond issue also permits construction to move ahead full speed, thus creating
the opportunity to realize

low interest

up

to

$250 million in lower construction costs by locking in current

rates.
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7.

Grant Anticipation Notes

Chapter
the

1

1

--

GANS

authorized the state to issue nearly $1.2 billion in grant anticipation notes (GANS) during
project costs are expected to exceed available funds.

1^8-2001 period when CA/T

Short term anticipator)' borrowing is a financing technique that is widely-used by governments. For
example, this technique is used in anticipation of long-term borrowing when the bond market is weak
or when there Is insufficient need at the time for the bond funds (BANS). It is also used when immediate
cash needs exceed current tax or other revenue collections (TANS and RANS).

For the CA/T project, 1998-2001 is the peak construction period, during which costs will greatly exceed
the more level flow of available funds. This situation will result in a cash or obligations flow deficit.
Between 2001 and 2005, the opposite situation should prevail with available funds exceeding costs and
producing a cash flow surplus. Thus, GANS would be used during the cash flow deficit period to be
repaid from the funds of the cash surplus period.
is how to structure the notes to be repaid by federal funds in a way that will make them
most marketable. State officials have met with several investment banking firms on how to best structure
them, especially on how to enhance the security of the notes beyond the future federal grants.

The problem

Chapter 1 1 authorizes the use of the state's full faith and credit to support $900 million in GANS. The
remaining $300 million might be secured solely by the federal funds without any credit enhancement.
However, these would be harder to market and probably more costly to the state. There are various
other ways to enhance the security of the notes, however; these alternatives are under discussion and

may

be used.

The use of GANS
recently issued
8.

amount sought by Massachusetts has not been done before, but
of about $500 - $600 million.

in the

GANS

New

Jersey

Metropolitan Highway System legislation

The new Metropolitan Highway System law creates a highway system within the Route 128 perimeter
which will be owned and managed by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), including the major
elements of the CA/T program. It includes a number of important implications for the Central
Artery/Tunnel project:
provides a mechanism for generating additional toll revenues on an expanded set of highway
which will include the new Ted Williams Tunnel, the existing Sumner and Callahan Tunnels,
and the Masspike extension. These revenues will be needed to help finance the construction, operation
and maintenance of CA/T components and to help with the short term cash flow deficit. The law
provides flexibility to the
in establishing a toll increase policy, a factor the bond rating agencies
consider critical when it comes to supporting
bonds. While the revenue potential applies only
to existing toll facilities at present, there may be future opportunities to expand the tolling or "charge
for use" concept to other components of the system, with appropriate changes in legislation at the state
and federal level. This could be a way to provide a more equitable distribution of the burden of toll
revenue generation among all the geographic segments of the metropolitan region. At present, tolls
are charged on facilities heavily used by North Shore and metro west communities, while communities
in the North and South that are served by 1-93 pay no tolls.
First,

it

facilities

MTA

MTA

MTA

Second, it puts the
in a new and important position in the CA/T construction process now in full
swing. As eventual "owner" of CA/T facilities,
is in a position to absorb some of the role of the
program manager in the remaining stages of the construction process, if it can expand its staff
capability. The current program manager, the B/PB joint venture, is budgeted just until the end of
2000. The remaining six years to complete all the CA/T work will require management supervision,
which ideally could be handled by switching some B/PB and
payroll. If
personnel to the

MTA

MHD

MTA
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this

happened before 2000, some portion of the funds currently allocated

to the Joint

Venture might

be cut back.

MTA expands its long term role in highway transportation not only by being the generator of
major toll revenues, but also by becoming actual "manager" of traffic flows and capacity on what will
be the key links in the metropolitan highway system. New traffic management technology will become
an important feature of the future. In addition, MTA will have the opportunity to play a major role in
the economic development of the region through the development of air rights over its highway
facilities. All this requires that MTA become a more important and responsive professional agency,
shedding its image as a third rate patronage-filled organization on the margins of transportation policy.
It will need to fit more closely into the political fabric of metropolitan Boston and the state than in the
Third,

past,

without jeopardizing

its

independence.

MTA's toll generating ability will be tested by its need, under the 1997 bond legislation, to come up
with $700 million as its share of project costs; by a poor federal funding scenario that could occur; and
system is complete.
by its need to provide annual operating funds when the

MHS

The plan
toll

for

revenue

MTA to become the owner of major CA/T facilities is sound, and it is needed as a
generating mechanism. If MTA can become a solid professional transportation

agency, the ability of the state to reduce project

enhanced

management and

operational costs should be

significantly.
Table

S.l

-CA/T FUNDING/FINANCIAL ISSUES

SUBJECT

FINDINGS

COST SAVING POTENTIAL

STATE BOND

Care must be taken to manage

Up to $250 million in

AUTHORIZATION

the issue properly to insure

construction costs could be

minimal impact on the Slate's

realized

bond

construction contracts that can

rating.

from

its

lower

host of

be awarded.

METROPOLITAN

The plan

HIGHWAY SYSTEM

the

LEGISLATION

facilities is

for

MTA to become

owner of major CA/T
sound.

Its toll

If

MTA can become a solid

professional transportation

agency quickly, the

ability of

generating ability will be

CA/T to reduce management

tested

costs should be enhanced.

ISTEAAND

If

FEDERAL FUNDING

increased over the conservative

Federal funding can be

assumptions
plan,

it

in the state finance

will help in

keeping

borrowing costs low.

USE OF GRANT

The use of

ANTICD?ATION

bridging of the cash flow

NOTES (CANS)

deficit

GANS

period

is

to insure the

appropriate.

GANS

are less costly and

more

marketable with the support of
the state's full faith and credit.
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CHAPTER 6-THE BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES

While the attention of the public has been and

will

be focused

in the

of the Central Artery and the Third Harbor Tunnel, there has been
to the implications of the system,

issues the policy

makers

will

have

once completed. However,
to face

and the costs of its operation, including

when

the system

it is

is in

near future on the construction

little

recent public attention paid

timely to consider a

number of

operation, the benefits are in place,

retiring the sizable debt generated

by the construction, are

evident.

When all the construction is completed,

there are three main categories of public benefits
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that will

result:

1.

An improved

flow of

traffic in

the center of the metropolitan region.

3.

New environmental amenities.
New economic development opportunities.

1.

Improved

2.

First

traffic

flow

and foremost, virtually

the heavy

all

volume of through

through downtown Boston and the adjacent waterfront areas
will
it

be moving underground

in

traffic

now moving

into,

out of and

South Boston on or above the surface

— out of sight and out of mind. The elevated Central Artery as we know

today will disappear and downtown Boston, one of the region's (and arguably one of the nation's)

vital

and vibrant economic

and expand with

assets, will

less traffic-related pollution

may improve somewhat. Also
highways

be greatly enhanced.

Second, and equally important, people

~ moving

access, particularly those located to
airport

by adding

than today. Traffic

in

the ability to control traffic flow and improve the safety of the

in regional centers will

the region and employees

which to function, grow
noise will be reduced and air quality

have a much better environment

to the congestion

—

business travelers, residents, students, tourists, visitors to

and from Logan Airport will have much better and quicker
the West and South of downtown who currently access the

to

and pollution of downtown as they

line

up

to use the Callahan

The connection of the new Ted Williams Tunnel to the Masspike, the Southeast Expressway
and the new Central Artery Tunnel will make this travel much more convenient than it is today. Since
the airport is one of the most important facilities supporting the entire economy of the metropolitan
region and Eastern New England, improved access will be a major benefit. About 88% of Logan

Tunnel.
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Other Benefits

--

There are a number of other economic benefits which the

CA/T project has

produced, two of

which are most apparent. First, local companies involved in the construction and engineering industry will have an
unmatched period of contract work which will boost their ability to improve the financial performance and
increase their power nationally and internationally. This is so because of the new design and construction
techniques used on the CA/T project that will be sought after in subsequent urban highway construction projects.
Second, the jobs created in the design and construction of the CA/T program will have made significant
contributions to the metropolitan economy over almost two decades of operation.
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travelers begin or

2.

end

their trip in

New environmental

Boston, requiring a

trip to

or from the airport.
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amenities

number of new public facilities that will enhance the environment of the region,
including new parks, open spaces in downtown and along the Charles River in Cambridge, and a park
on Spectacle Island in Boston Harbor made possible by using soil excavated for the tunnels to cap
the existing landfill on the island.

There

will be a

Modernized sewers

built in

connection with the

CA/T

project, along with capping the Spectacle

Island landfill, will contribute significantly to efforts to clean

up Boston Harbor -- a long term priority

of the region for environmental improvement.

The

utilities

downtown
3.

program allows the major water, sewer, and telephone service providers in the
install new and modernized facilities, including a fiber optics system.

relocation

area to

New economic development opportunities

In addition to the 27 acres of land which will be
the environment in

made

improvements in the quality of
downtown Boston when the artery structure is removed, a new piece of important
available for

land area, previously only marginally accessible, will be opened up for high quality future economic

development. The seafront area on the northern fringe of South Boston,
old, often obsolete industrial buildings, will

interchange on the

mostly parking lots and

be opened up for new development as a result of the new

Masspike connector as well as the new transit way
This will help provide expansion space both for the burgeoning financial

Ted Williams Tunnel

connection to South Station.

still

-

institutions of downtown

Boston and for businesses connected to the airport. While planning for the
reclaimed land in the Artery corridor has received most of the attention, it is this area (in what once
housed seaport functions) that may offer the most important long term economic benefits.
Already the

new

Federal Court

under construction and the

There remain a number of other

owned

House and

site for the
sites,

the

new World Trade Center

specific facilities

in the area.

many under the ownership and control of Massport and others

Peter Blute,

who

will

and the improved environment created by the

categories of beneficiaries

Move

who

should benefit more than most.

be able to take advantage of the

CA/T
34

project, there are

These

two

specific

are, first, the specific users

Massachusetts 2000 Update, April 1997, Vol. 4. No. 4

34 Overall, mitigation practices
in

complex are

privately, that will receive the accessibility windfall.

In addition to the metropolitan region's general public,
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office/hotel

proposed convention center has been selected

that

have emerged from the Project have raised the standards

both the quality and quantity of Project-neighborhood interaction.

An

for large-scale

urban construction

elaborate community-liaison network that focuses on

advance notification and sanction has given even smaller community groups influence and leverage in day-to-day UCtion
operations. In

fact, the

public dimension of the Project involves an impressive array of community based groups ranging from

super coalitions like Mass

Move 2000 to smaller groups representing distinct constituencies

the umbrella groups, scores of private and nonprofit organizations

(like the Fort Point artists). Through
have become well-educated, sophisticated, thoroughly active
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of the new highway

and second, the owners and users of the property receiving the
Both of these categories should be able to contribute a higher share of the

facilities,

accessibility windfall.

operating costs of the system, including debt retirement, than the rest of the public.

The

users of CA/T system improvements

With the completion of the expanded and depressed Central Artery and the links from the Southeast
Expressway and the Turnpike extension to the Ted Williams Tunnel, there will be dramatic
improvements for highway users (private autos, commercial vehicles like taxis and limousines, and
trucks) making three specific types of trips;

Those moving through the center of the region from North to and from the South on 1-93
using the Artery. These trips represent about 70% of all traffic carried on the Artery at

•

present.

Those using 1-90 and 1-93

•

to reach

downtown

destinations, (about

30%

of present Artery

traffic).

from Logan Airport and the North shore communities using the three
tunnels and the Tobin Bridge now serving the area.

Those moving

•

Of these

to and

three major beneficiaries of travel improvements, users of the tunnels and the Turnpike

extension are the only ones
will not

who

will be

charged a

toll for

the use of the

facilities.

Those using 1-93

be so charged, even though the Central Artery tunnel will be the major expense of the system.

While the decision not to erect
in the design process,

3S

there

traffic

may be

bottleneck-producing

on 1-93 was made

toll barriers

early

on

other technologies available in the future to charge users of the

system elements and help balance out the current charge structure.

We

note that the issue of the

tolls to help finance the costs of the CA/T project were noted at
on
the
Metropolitan
Highway System legislation. While Boston region drivers pay
the recent hearings
relatively low tolls on their highway facilities compared to those paid by drivers in the New York

imbalance of the burden of paying

region, for example, they should be able to afford the increases proposed as part of the

MHS system

However, the question of who among the system beneficiaries should carry the burden of
costs of these expensive improvements is an issue which should continue to be placed on the

operation.
the

public policy agenda.

in the planning function,

and generally able

to

work out difficulties.

In the long term, then, the project

may have

diverse constituencies and even strengthen the political influence of groups in a city that has long been
to

known

served to unify

for being unable

overcome divisiveness among community stakeholders.
While Federal law provided

that

new highways

built

under the Interstate Highway Program were to be

Federal regulations can permit Federal Interstate funds to be used for constructing

toll facilities, at

toll free,

the provisions of the current

the discretion of the States.
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Land development

beneficiaries

There are a number of specific beneficiaries who should be able to profit from the improved
accessibility of the areas in which their property is located as a result of CA/T improvements. There
are two which stand out above the rest. These are;

Property owners in the South Boston industrial waterfront, which include both public
agencies like Massport and a number of private interests. These owners are already
developing plans for major new developments in the area under the general guidance of the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, a situation which should transform the area into one of the
outstanding waterfront commercial and residential areas in future years.

•

Property owners in downtown, particularly those public agencies and private interests with
parcels in the Government Center North end area which will benefit greatly from the removal
of the Central Artery viaduct. Included in this mix are the major tourist attractions like
Faneuil Hall Market Place and the New England Aquarium along with some hotels and other
commercial establishments in the North End. These are the properties whose current users
are suffering the most from the current construction activities, but whose owners should reap
the greatest long term benefits.

•

Windfalls and wipeouts
date, one of the least discussed features of the CA/T project is the fact that even though it is the
most costly of the major urban highway construction projects undertaken in the United States, it is
likely to be the one in which the windfalls, particularly in the form of the increased value of
affected property, not to mention those accruing to businesses benefiting directly from improved
highway services (taxi and limousine owners featuring Airport service, for example), far outweigh
the wipeouts resulting from property takings. This is a unique feature of the program, due in large
part to the ability of most of the improvements to be made within the boundaries of existing rights-ofway. The ability of the general public, whose agencies and tax resources are paying for this massive
investment, to share in the windfalls should be an important item on the public policy agenda of the

To

region.

3*

Examining longer term policy
As

issues re: benefits/cost recovery

the construction of the various pieces of the

CA/T project

are completed and put into operation,

on what measures the Commonwealth can
take to recoup the costs of developing this tremendous but costly improvement in the infrastructure
of Metropolitan Boston. While to date the public policy issues have correctly focused on how the
project should be built and what should be included in the extensive package of improvements being
implemented, the policy issues involved in how the benefits are distributed and how the beneficiaries
the important public policy issues will focus in large part

1

During the intense period of development of the Interstate system

in the 1970's, the Federal

Highway

Administration undertook a number of research studies designed to determine the extent that the highway program

was creating windfalls and wipeouts and how the windfalls could be ussd

to

compensate for the negative impact

of the wipeouts.
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might be asked to contribute to the cost have not received the same scrutiny. Among the range of
urban public services, transportation system improvements in particular are among those most
susceptible to user charges and do not require funding from general tax revenues.

However, there are controversies

on good user charge and cost
recovery policy. Which of the various beneficiaries of the improvement should contribute to its
continuing operation and upkeep of the improved system, including servicing its debt ? In what form
should this contribution be collected — through tolls, gas taxes, benefit assessments on affected
property, special licences for major users, additional fees on downtown parking, and others? What
is fair and what will fly? We think these questions are particularly appropriate for the Legislature to
consider since significantly more of the cost of the project will fall on Commonwealth public
resources than was anticipated when the project was conceived in the heyday of the federal
that can be expected in deciding

government's Interstate Highway program.

As part of this study,

the

McCormack Institute was able to benefit from public opinion surveys which

questioned Massachusetts citizens on their attitudes toward the "Big Dig." In one such survey dealing

with attitudes towards broad public policy issues, of those

something about the project, over
over

70%

money
share.

responded favorably
complete the project

to

37

However,

during the
project,

over

facilities,

among

Weld

to the question
if

of whether the state should try to

come up with the
its

original

another survey focusing on the performance on the Massachusetts agencies

administration, the response to the question of

60%

had heard
from the project and

the federal government decided to spend less than

how

of the respondents were opposed to increases

all

the transportation and public

the state should pay for the

in tolls

on any of the

existing

works agencies whose performance was ranked

for general

CA/T project management was ranked the lowest. This led the authors of the survey

conclude that "the combination of dissatisfaction with project management and lack of support for

funding solutions suggests that the project could
in

to identify benefits resulting

that they

and higher percentages opposed raising gas taxes or using general revenues. Furthermore,

satisfaction, the

to

in

80% were able

who responded

become a

political

nightmare

need of more public explanation of the benefits and costs associated with

it."

This

is

a project

38

in any attempt to determine what are fair and
methods for encouraging various categories of beneficiaries to contribute to the cost of the
CA/T improvements. But there is also time before the facilities are opened to study the options and
air the debate. Such an airing appears to have some urgency. As a prelude to any legislative action
in this arena, additional research and analysis could provide data for these issues to be identified and

There are a whole set of public policy issues involved
equitable

discussed with various parties at interest.
to see that this research

From an

analysis of the

is

We think

it

would be in the interests of the Commonwealth

carried out with dispassionate education of the public in mind.

UMass/McCormack

surveys of 400 Massachusetts voters conducted in January and

April, 1997
38

From Mass

Insight; "State of the State;

Year Seven of the Weld Administration" February, 1997 (Mass Insight

surveys conducted by Opinion Dynamics Corporation), pages 14, 15, 19.
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Appendix
Analysis of

CA/T Project

1

Cost: History

and Trend

1.

Introduction

This appendix includes a series of notes addressing several topics on the cost of the Central

Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project. These include the historical cost growth, the structure of the
project cost

managed and reported by

the

CA/T

Project Office, and the monitoring of the project

cost to highlight trends.

2.

Tracking Historical Cost Growth Data

Recent news reports cite two different figures for the cost: $7.78 billion in the Boston Globe
4
3
and 10.4 billion in both the Boston Globe and Patriot Ledger At its inception in 1985, the

1

'

2

.

CA/T Project had
to

an estimated price of $2,564

an estimated cost

at

$7.78 billion

5
.

billion.

Subsequent scope and design changes led

Further revisions and additions to the project resulted in the

6

The following paragraphs summarize the nature of these changes
and revisions in order to clarify the contexts of the different cost data.
cost of $10.4 billion in 1996.

There are apparent differences between the cost data from Central Artery/Tunnel Project Office
and those used by the GAO. McCormack Institute prepared a set of cost charts for the CA/T Cost
7
Study for comments by CA/T Project Office. We received comments annotated on a working
8
document prepared by the McCormack study team, the F/C/R, by CA/T project management on
March 18, 1997; Attachment 1 in this response includes corrections to various cost figures.

1

2
3

John M, "Rep. Kennedy Denounces Weld Over Possible Big Dig Funds Loss," The Boston Globe February 6, 1997.
Jr., "State Could Get Help Financing Big Dig From Clinton, Moynihan," The Boston Globe March 9, 1997, p B8.
Palmer, Thomas C, Jr., and John M. Biers, "State Would Lose Less in Highway Bill," The Boston Globe March 13, 1997, p Al.
Layton, Lyndsey, "No Tolls for Expressway," The Patriot Ledger February 12, 1997, p 6.
"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995 as Amended February 1996.
"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, September 1996.
"CA/T Cost Study - Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations(F/C/R): Initial Story Line" Unpublished Working Draft, McCormack
Biers,

,

Palmer, Thomas,

,

,

4

,

5
6
7

University of Massachusetts Boston,
8

Institute,

March 4, 1997.

Bill, "Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request,"
Memorandum to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 13, 1997. This contains both answers
to questions from the McCormack Institute in the said Request and comments to the Initial Story Line, March 4, 1997.
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2.1

Scope Changes: 1985 to 1992

A series of major scope changes occurred in the period from

1985 to 1992. These changes are
9
summarized in Table 2-1. There are significant cost impacts associated with these changes.
Table 2-2 shows the cost increases that are allocated directly to the Central Artery Project.

Table 2-2 Scope Changes,

$K
Estimated Cost

GAO,

Item

CA/T March

1995

1997
Original Estimates

Charles River Crossing

508,000

508,000

262,000

262,000

Right-of-ways

173,000

173,000

Extend 1-93 South

130,000

130,000

Utility Relocation

85,000

85,000

South Boston Haul Road/Bypass Road

53,000

23,000

(18,000)

(18,000)

1,193,000

1,163,000

Tunnel Covers

176,000

176,000

Material Disposal/Hazardous Materials

141,000

141,000

Subtotal. Mitigation

317,000

317,000

I-90/I93

HO V Lanes

Deleted Rte
Subtotal,

1A

Interchange

CA/T highway

Joint Venture Contract

263,000

263,000

Workmen's Compensation

237,000

237,000

Other

612,000

642,000

1,112,000

1,142,000

2,622,000

2,622,000

897,000

258,800

3,519,000

2,880,800

Subtotal,

Total 1993 Estimates

1995 Adjustments (Note 1)
Total Adjusted Changes

Table 2-2 shows the scope changes up and through 1995. The costs associated with these
10

changes are based on comments from the CA/T Project Office and GAO report.
There are
differences between the GAO and CA/T data in three items: (1) South Boston Haul Road/Bypass

Road, (2) Other, and (3) 1995 Adjustments. The difference
item on "1995 Adjustments".

The

item, "Other", has a substantial cost of $612

GAO report nor the CA/T Attachment

1

in costs is

most pronounced

for the

M (GAO estimate) or $642 M. Neither the

explains the nature of this item.

9

"Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute
Memorandum to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 13, 1997.
10

Kenneth M. Mead, "History of Central Artery/Tunnel Project Costs," Enclosure

Transportation Committee on Appropriation,
Office, Washington,

DC All amounts are in

III,

in Letter to

Request," Interoffice

Frank Wolf, Chairman, Subcommittee on
2, 1995, United States General Accounting

House of Representatives, GA0/RCED-95-213R, June
1994

dollars.

A-3

The item "1995" Adjustment,

consists of, according to the

GAO report (Enclosure V, p

17),

provisions for further cost growth:

Design cost growth

@ 8%

$352.0

1

Construction cost growth

@

M

15%

$897.0 M.

Total

The

Joint

Venture however identified

costs (see Section 2.2) at $258.8

2.2

M

$545.0

this

adjustment (Attachment

11

as the Third Party related

l)

M.

Support Costs (Exclusions) and Third-Party

Sometime during the period of 1985-1995, the CA/T Project assumed management responsibility
for a number of other projects related to but not directly part of the core construction of the
Artery and the TunneL These other projects fall into two categories: Support (or exclusions) and
Third Party. The Exclusions are items not included as the direct cost of CA/T Project and are not
eligible for (or excluded from) federal funding support. The cost for these project elements are
referred to as Support Costs by CA/T Project. Table 2-3 tabulates these support items. Also
included in Table 2-3 are the Third Party Costs for projects elements that are paid for by third
parties but are integrated into the CA/T Project. These are primarily MBTA facilities and certain
state- wide roadway projects.
Table 2-3 consists of two parts (A) and (B). Panel (B) shows the Exclusion items
1

Finance Plan

.

Panel (A)

those reported by

noted that there
total estimated

to

listed in

CA/T

1

.

costs in Panel (A) are

is no one-to-one correspondence between the items in Panels (A) and (B).
by GAO is $12 million higher than the CA/T estimate. Finally it is noted that
Panel (B) there is one item referred to as Third party cost at $13 million.

It is

11

GAO report

The
those based on comments from CA/T.

the items included in the

GAO as well as

The
in

lists

"Joint Venture

Ann

(CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment

Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts

Highway Department, March

1

to

"McCormack Institute Request,"

Interoffice

Memorandum

13, 1997.

" "Finance Plan", Central Artery/Tunnel

Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995"as Amended February 1996, p 13.
M. Mead "Summary of Items Excluded from MHD's Draft Estimate," Enclosure IV, in Letter to Frank Wolf,
Chairman. Subcommittee on Transportation Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-95-213R June 2, 1995, United
States General Accounting Office, Washington, DC. All amounts are in 1994 dollars.

Exclusions are from Kenneth

A-4

Table 2-3 Support Costs (Exclusions).

$K

<A>

(B)

1

Items

GAO

CA/T

Estimates

Estimates
Mar 1997

1995

tl]

^Connections to Turnpike Facilities

248,900
177,000

Logan Airport (Connections to Rte 1 A)
flMaintenance/Support Facilities

llunnel Fire Testing

(in

W.

CA/T

Facilities (1-93

ramps, message signs

Amended

2/96

[3]

44,600
19,100

19,000

Tunnels)

Temporary

!

8/95,

[2]

230,000
180,000
55,000
45,000

52,700

Virginia, for

CA/T

items

230,000
180,000
55,000
45,000

Project/Toll Interfaces

Logan Airport Interchange
Operation/Maintenance

Research and Development
Agreements

etc.)

Scope Deferrals (HOV)

18,100

18,000

Highway Cost

560,400

Transit Related

Funded Items

68,600
6,300
169,500

170,000 State Transportation Improvements

170.000

Other Transportation-related Cost

244,400

243,000 Other Transportation-related Cost

237,000

North-South Rail Link
State-only

Surface Restoration (CA, Ft Point Ch, Spectacle

69,400

547,000 Highway Cost

510,000
67,000

67,000 Transit Related Scope
6,000

50,000 Artery Restoration Enhancements

50,000

I.)

Environmental Mitigation (Cambridge;
training; Fire

CB

105,700

105,000 Environmental Mitigation

30,000

Agreements

Departments, etc)

75.000

Mitigation/Interagency Service

Mitigation Cost

17S.,100

29,900

Others

155,000

155,000 Mitigation Cost

Summer St

53,000 Other(Broadway,

82 OOOl

bridges, surface streets.)

(MBTA)

Third Party Cost

29,000

Others, subtotal

Total

2.3

1,009,800

53,000

95,000|

997,OOo|

998,000 Total

Inflation

In addition to the effects of scope changes and exclusions, the
escalating due to inflation.

The

CA/T

Project cost has been

cost increases over the years due to inflation are

summarized

in

Table 2-4.

The data on

inflation are

drawn from

three sources. There appears to be significant divergence in

the estimated inflation for the period from 1994 through 2004.

million

is

nearly

100%

higher than the

GAO estimate of $737

The CA/T estimate of $1387
million.

A-5

Table 2-4

M

Cost Impact from Inflation, $

Notes

Inflation

SM
1985

1987
1989
1991
1992
1993

565
462
458

1
1
1

641

1

428
2554

Subtotal

GAO
1994-2004
Total

1

CAJT

737

1387

3291

3941

2,3

14

•

Note

1:

Inflation data

•

Note

2:

Inflation estimates,

GAO report (Enclosure V). 15

•

Note

3:

Inflation estimates,

CA/T (Attachment

2.3

from Luberoff and Altshuler.
l)

16

1995/1996 Cost Estimates

The preceding account of the elements of cost growths
the resultant cost estimates of $7.74 billion in

summarized in Table 2-5 indicating
the 1995 Finance Plan and of $10.4 billion in the
are

1996 Finance Plan.
Table 2-4 shows the cost growth on the CA/T Project from 1985 to 1996 based on the changes
described above both in accordance with the GAO estimates and the CA/T estimates. The final
1995 and 1996 estimates from the two organizations are identical although there are large
differences in the estimated scope adjustments in 1995 and the expected out-year inflation. Table

2-6 shows the historical cost growth trend using the scope change data from Luberoff and
Altshuler (1996). In this table,

we use

the 1995

GAO estimates for the adjustments and future

The result, as noted above, would be unchanged
shows the cost growth graphically.

inflation allowance.
in 1995.

Figure

1

for the total estimated cost

14

Luberoff, David, and Alan Altshuler, "Mega-Project: A Political History of Boston's Multibillion-Dollar Artery/Tunnel Project." J. F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. Revised Edition, April 1996.
15
Kenneth M. Mead, "History of Central Artery/Tunnel Project Costs," Enclosure III, in Letter to Frank Wolf, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-95-213R, June 2, 1995, United States General Accounting
Office, Washington, DC. All amounts are in 1994 dollars.
16
"Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request," Interoffice

Memorandum to Ann Davis,

Central Artery Project, Massachusetts

Highway Department, March

1

3,

1997.

A-6

Table 2-5 Budget Estimates,

$M

GAO

CA/T

1985 Estimate

2,564

2,564

Inflation through 1993

2,554

2,554

Scope Change Pre-95

2,622

2,622

1995 Estimate, Unadjusted

7,740

7,740

Exclusions

1,010

998

897

259

737

1,387

1995 Estimate

10,384

10,384

1996 Finance Plan

10,400

10,400

Scope, 1995
Inflation

1993-1995

Table 2-6

History of Project Cost Estimate

Year

Estimate

Exclusions

1985
1987
1989
1991
1992

2,564.0

-

1993
1995
1996
Total

Changes

Inflation

Projected Cost

2,564.0

-

-

3,185.0

46.0

4,436.0

799.0

565.0
462.0

4,446.0

5,193.0

299.0
609.0

458.0
641.0

6,443.0

6,443.0

5,193.0

869.0

428.0

7,740.0

1,009.8

897.0

737.0

10,383.8

1,009.8

3,519.0

3,291.0

7,740.0
7,740.0

3,175.0

10,400.0

10,400.0

A-7

Figure

1

Growth

of Project

Cost

BOOO

GOOG

4000

2000

2.4

Finance Plan Budgets

as amended February 1996) lists the CA/T budget being $7.78
and $10.4 billion in 1996. The Finance Plan, September 1996, reaffirms the
$10.4 billion. Table 2-7 summarizes the budgets by functions.

The Finance Plan (August 1995
billion in 1995

budget

at

Table 2-7

Summary of Financial

Plans,

Finance Plan

Finance Plan
8/95

amended 2/96

[11

Type

$B

9/96
[3]

[21

C/SUR6

Total (2/ 96)

Estimate

Cost to Date

Remaining

Total

(7/1/96)

(7/1/96)

(7/1/96)

(Updated)
7.2

Construction

5.871

7.1

2.4

4.7

Design
Right of Way
Sale of Air Rights
Prior to ICE and

0.770
0.386

0.9

0.8

0.2

1.0

0.4

0.4

0.0

0.4

-0.225
-0.391

Committed Escalation
Program Management

1.369

2.0

1.3

0.5

1.8

Total

7.780

10.4

4.9

5.4

10.41

A-8

Table 2-7 shows that the total budget and need-as-of date are:

Budget. $B

Need

Source
Finance Plan, 8/95 Amended 2/96, Table
Finance Plan, 9/96, p vii
Finance Plan, 9/96, p vii

as of

[1]

7.78

7/1/95

[2]

10.4

7/1/95

[3]

10.4

7/1/96

1

There is a discrepancy of $40M between the budgets of $7.74 B and $7.78 B in Table 2-5 and
Table 2-7 respectively for the unadjusted 1995 estimates. This may be in part due to the 'saving'
of $225 million from

air rights in

column

[1]

whereas elsewhere

in the

Finance Plan, the

air rights

are 'saving' from air rights.

The saving from air rights is also referred to as credit for future sale of air rights.
Whichever the name the item amounts to a reduction of project cost when it is credited
to the project account. Section 3.1 provides a discussion on the inclusion of this item in
,

the budget.

There

is

$1,805

a large increase in estimated

billion in

management cost from $1,369

September 1996. There

is

no explanation

in the

billion in

February 1995 to

Finance Plan for the large

management cost. Factors that possibly contribute to this increase include:
Management cost for the Exclusions and scope changes, and reserves.

increase in the

Insurance,

We considers the September
baseline; this is

budget

Even

in the

for the

1996 Finance Plan Estimate, Column

also widely cited by various government

B

[3], as the latest official

and news media. The operating

CA/T monthly management report differs from that
month of June 1996, the base month for the Finance

(excluding air rights) and $10.4

3.

officials

in the

Finance Plan budget.

Plan, the budgets are $10.92

B

respectively.

Cost Structure and Monthly Management Report

3.1

Project Cost

Summary

The Central Artery/Tunnel Project Office holds monthly meetings for management review. The
Monthly Management Report is therefore the most useful method to for tracking progress on the
project and related changes. The CA/T Project office manages the project cost in three parts:

CA/T

Direct Costs, Support Costs, and Third Party Related Costs. However, the monthly

management report includes only two cost

charts:

CA/T Direct

Costs and
Support Costs (Includes Third Party Related Costs).

A-9

A) and (B), from the monthly report for January 1997 (pp. 17A and 17B)
are shown in rank 3-1. Oddly, the report docs not include a top level summary chart for the total
project under management Tabic 3- includes this missing chart. Panel (C), for the total cost,
rhese charts, Panels

(

1

i.e.,

the

sum

of the direct and the support costs.

Air Rights
The cost elements

in these charts

treatment

is

it

as a cost item in the budget.

The McCormack
when recovered at

a reduced project cost.

rights as a source of revenue that,

cost of the project.

physical asset

It is

not a cost saving

owned by

on

the Massachusetts

a future date, would partially pay for the

The CA/T

Highway System;
is

Consistent with view

Project results in a future

the value of the asset value

a difference between these two views: (1) the

cost to acquire an asset, the project cost and (2) the future
of.

Project Office regards this

The consequence of this

Institute regards the recovery of the air

the project.

includes marketable value of the air rights. There

disposed

CA/T

include a credit for air rights.

as a potential cost saving and treats

book value

after a part

of the asset

is

(1), the total costs in these panels in Table 3-1 are adjusted to

air rights. (CA/T Project Office acknowledges this alternate method of accounting
September 1996 Finance Plan by excluding the air rights in its budget estimate of $10.4

exclude the
its

in

billion.)

Current Budget: Unescalated

CA/T management
current budget

is

vs.

Escalated

shows both unescalated and escalated current budgets. The escalated
more meaningful of the two because it represents the expected cost as it is

report

the

incurred and paid for in nominal money. In the discussion to follow, the current budget,
escalated,

budget,

is

we

used unless stated otherwise. However, before

we

note that the total direct cost budget (unescalated)

Finance Plan budget estimate
a sizeable $218

M. The

is

$7780M.

17

The

is

leave the subject of unescalated

$7998M

difference between these

escalation of the total project cost, Panel (C),

is

in

Panel (A) whereas

two budget numbers

$1,233

B

is

(=10.991-

9.758) also does not appear to relate to the estimated inflation in Table 2-5. Thus the origin of the

budget plan

'

in

Table 3-1 remains a question.

"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995 as

Amended February

1996, Table

12.
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3.2

Design and Construction

[He month!) report includes a series of gantt charts. The charts list time lines and cost data for
work packages on design and construction. These charts, (pp. 3-13), tabulate the package costs
by final design and construction for the segments of the project. One chart (January 1997 report,
p. 2)

provides

summary

summary data on

data are also in

the project activities. Table 3-2

shows these summary

data.

These

in the gantt charts.

agreement with the subsidiary package cost data

Table 3-2 Design and Construction Costs
(January 1997)
Current Budget
(Escalated)

vVBS

Final Design
Tunnel

94.1

94.1

88.3

1-90

188.2

192.7

182.9

1-93

335.9

342.6

308.7

Systemwide

58.3

57.3

53.5

Design reserve
Subtotal Final Design

11.7

7.6

688.2

694.3

633.4

Construction
Tunnel

1115.3

1126.3

1104.5

1-90

1702.1

1738.5

790.2

1-93

3819.4

3964.3

1956.6

592.2

600.9

213.5

27.9

27.8

7.6

Subtotal Construction

7256.9

7457.8

4072.4

Total

7945.1

8152.1

4705.8

Systemwide
Misc.

The

Cost-to-date

Potential Forecast

subtotal for construction cost in Table 3-2 are in agreement with the costs for construction

Table 3-1, Panel (C). Because of this agreement for the construction packages, one
would also expect similar agreement for the total cost of the final design packages. The design

packages

in

costs in Table 3-2 are different from and lower than the cost data in Table 3-1, in Panel (C) for
the total project cost. Table 3-3 displays these discrepancies.

Table 3-3 Differences between Design Costs in January 1996 Report
Budget

Forecast

Cost-to-Date

(Project Summary
(Table 3-1

852

859

759

&

688

694

633

164

165

126

JFmal Design

(Design

Table

Construction

3-2

(Unidentified Design
1 Items
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3.3

Project Reserves

The cost data

in the

CA/T monthly report include

various reserves. These are summarized in

Table 3-4 from the January 1997 report. Reserves are held in accounts for design, construction,

and management. The construction reserves are also known as project change authorization
(PCA). Total reserve at end of January 1997 has a budget of $390 million and a forecast of
$251.7 million.

Summary

Table 3-4

of Project Reserve (January 1997)

Current
Budget
Design reserve

Potential

Forecast
7.6

11.7

Construction (PCA)

Tunnel
1-90
1-93
j

3.4

Subtotal Construction

74

71.2

151.1

145.3

28.8

27.6

253.9

244.1

(Management Reserve

124.4

|Total

390.0

Joint Venture

251.7

Management Cost

The Joint Venture is currently operating under contracts for Work Plans 13 and 14. The monthly
management includes separate management review charts (pp. 28A and 28B) for these two
plans. Table 3-5 below shows the combined status of these two charts for month of January
1997.

Table 3-5 Management Cost,

WP 13 and WP 14, $M

[Contract

Expenditure

Current
Budget

Forecast

i

(Max

|

170.3

170.3

30.7

28.7

Labor
Base Fee
Budgeted Incentive Fee

189.5

189.5

34.0

30.0

36.0

36.0

6.6

6.6

3.6

3.6

0.0

0.0

Total Labor Related

399.4

399.4

71.3

65.3

91.9

91.9

22.2

16.5

1.8

1.8

1.8

Total Direct Expense

93.7

93.7

24.0

16.51

Total Before Reserve

491.3

491.3

95.3

81.71

19.1

19.1

510.4

510.4

95.3

81.7

Direct Labor
Indirect

Direct Expense
Director's Reserve

Reserve for Cost Basis Adj.
[Total

|

A-13

The management cost charts (pp. 28A and 28B) provide information only for a segment of the
overall management cost They do not directly relate to the project cost summary charts in Table
3-1 because the management report does not show explicitly cither the pre-WP 13/14 cost or the
post-WP 13/14 cost. The contract expiration dates are June 1997 for Work Plan 13 and
December 1999 for Work Plan 14. We assume that both work plans, 13 and 14, started on or
about 7/1/96 and that the cost prior to 7/1/96 were covered by Work Plans through No. 12. Since
the contracts for work plan 14 expires in 1999, there will be a future work plan for management
beyond 1^99 until the completion of the CA/T Project in 2004. With these assumptions, one can
infer from Table 3- 1 and Table 3-5 that the future cost as shown in Table 3-6. This table
indicates that beyond the contracts for work plans 13 and 14, there is a future work plan cost of
$210 million required to complete the CA/T Project. Thus, the sum total of cost for work plan
13/14 and future work plans is $720 million, as shown in the last row of Table 3-6. This sum
represents the to-go cost as of July 1, 1996. This compares with the to-go estimate of $505
million in the Finance Plan (September 1996). Thus, with the Finance Plan as a baseline, the
current monthly report (January 1997) projects a cost growth of

$215 million

for the Joint

Venture management.

Table 3-6 Reconciliation of Management Cost,
Budget
Prior

Work

Plans, prior to

$M

Cost-to-

Estimate-to-

Date

Complete

912

912

510

82

7/1/96

Work
Work

Plan 13
Plans 14

409.

(from Table 3-5)
Future

Project

Work Plan(s)
Management Total

210

210

1632

994

638

720

82

638

(from Table 3-1)

Work

Plans, 7/1/96 to

Completion

A- 14

3.5

Budgets and Cost Variances

The Project currently uses a different breakout of the cost items from that in the Finance Plan
which uses only four line items. This makes it difficult to analyze variance of any specific cost
items. As an illustration, we consolidate the line items in the January 1997 management report to
correspond to the items in the Finance Plan as shown in Table 3-7.
Table 3-7 Budgets and Cost Variances, $B
Variance

Potential

7/96 Budget

Type

Forecast

Forecast

Sep 1996

Budget

%

$B

Mgmt Report

Finance Plan,

-

Jan 97

of

7/97 Budget

IConstruction

7.20

7.85

0.65

[Design

1.00

1.01

0.01

Right of Way

0.40

0.47

0.07

9.1%
0.8%
18.5%

Management

1.80

1.63

-0.17

-9.4%

10.40

10.97

0.57

5.4%

|Total

In this consolidation,

Two
Two

construction items and the geotech item in Table 3-1 are combined;

design items are

Joint Venture

summed

together; and

and insurance items are lumped into one item.

Table 3-7 compares the consolidated forecast from the management report with the budgets for
the comparable items from the 1996 Finance Plan. The variances between the forecast and
budgets are shown in the

left

columns, in dollars and in percents.

The comparison indicates that the bulk of the cost increase
the management cost has a projected reduction at $170M.

is

due

to construction, at

5.4% of budget.

•

Overall project cost increase

•

In percentage, right-of-way incurs the largest increase at 18.5%.

•

Management

is

$0.57 B,

at

$650M, and

(including insurance and reserve) has the

most favorable change

at

-

9.4%.

The negative variance for management is most likely a consequence of including insurance and
reserve in management at one time but excluding them at another. We examine this later.
appears that the management line items in Table 3-7 have different compositions in the various
budgets and forecast because of the different way insurance and management reserves are
accounted for. Thus an appropriate way to evaluate cost variance is not to consolidate but to

It

A- 15

disaggregate the line items to be consistent with the break out in the Management Report.
believe thai the decomposition in Table 3-8 accomplishes this equalization.

Decomposing Budget and Cost Variances, $B

Table 3-8

'

^ Budaei Potential

Variance
Forecast- 7/96 Budget

Forecast
[b]

[a]

T\pe

Finance Plan,

Mgmt

Sep 1996

Jan 97

Report

[cj=[b]-[a]

Id]

$b

%

7/96 Budget

9.1%

Construction

7.200

7.853

0.653

Design

1.000

1.008

0.008

0.8%

Right of Way

0.400

0.474

0.074

1.800

1.631

-0.169

18.5%
-9.4%

Management

We

&

Other
Insurance

0.389

-0.001

-0.390

-100.3%

Reserve

0.125

0.000

-0.125

-100.0%

Management

1.286

1.632

0.346

26.9%

10.400

10.966

0.566

5.4%

Total

Table 3-8

treats insurance

and reserve as separate

line items

by making two

assumptions.

Assumption

(1):

incurred prior to

Commitment on

Work Plans

insurance,

$389 M,

in

Table 3-1, was expenditure

13/14.

Assumption (2): The September 1996 Finance Plan estimate for the management cost
indeed has $125
tucked in Management as reserve.
Given these assumptions, the actual management cost in the Finance Plan is as shown
in Table 3-8, in amount of $1,286 billion.
By restating the budgets with separate sub items as in Table 3-8, one sees a dramatic
difference in the cost variance on the management items.

M

Whereas the variance for management is negative at $169M when it is inclusive, the
variance becomes positive at $346M when it is exclusive.
The variance as percentage has a swing of 26.3%, from -9.4 to +26.9%, when the
reserve and insurance cost are removed from the management line item.
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4.

Analysis of CA/T Contract Bid Prices and Contractors

Introduction

4.1

from CA/T Project Office a 71 -item listing of the contract bid
prices along with the pre-bid estimated costs. There were wide differences between the highest
and the lowest bid prices for most contracts. Furthermore, there have been differences between
the estimated cost and the actual bids.

McCormack

4.2

Institute received

Data on Bids

The data on

bids cover 71 contracts in period from 1990 through January 1997 and are displayed
Table 4-1. The values of awarded contracts, to the low bidders, varied from under $500K to
about $400,000K. There are significant differences between the bids and the estimates. For the
individual contracts, the ratio of high bid to low bid varies from 1.00 to 3.00.
in

The following paragraphs present
4.3

Summary

the results of analyzing the bid data.

Statistics

The low and high

bids, relative to the estimates, are both essentially

normally distributed. The

normalized low and high have mean values of 0.84 and 1.16 respectively. That
average, the low bid

is

16% below and

the high bid

is

16% above

contracts are awarded to low bidders, one infers that any contract
statistically at

is

to say,

on the

the cost estimate. Since the

would have a value

that

is

16% below the estimate.

The mean difference between the low bid price and the estimated price show variation according
to work breakdown (or project segment), Table 4-1, and according to year of contract award,
Table 4-2. In these tables, the column "Sum" shows the total difference between the bid values
and the estimated values of the contracts according to the classification.

Table 4-1

WBS
S.

Boston

E. Boston

Difference between

Low Bid and Estimate by WBS, $K
Sum
(23,876)

Average!
(2,171)

(93,514)

(8,501)

South Bay
C. Artery
C. A. North

(118,139)

(11,814)

(67,088)

(4,473)

2,055

294

Projectwide

(77,970)

(7,797)

Geotech

50

17

General

(8,572)

(2,143)

(387,055)

(5,451)

Total

A- 17

Table 4-2

Difference between

Low Bid and

Estimate by Year of Award,

$K

Year

Sum

Average

1990

(578)

(289)

1991

(34,353)

(4,294)

[992

(83,636)

(10,455)

1993

(72,863)

(6,072)

L994

(67,264)

(5,174)

L995

(104,122)

(8,009)

1996

(64,300)

(4,946)

1997

40,061

20,030

Total

(387,055)

(5,451)

4.4 Distribution of

The graph

in

High and

Low

Bids

Figure 2 shows the ratios high/estimate and low/estimate as functions of estimate.

Visually there appears to be no relationship between the deviation bids from estimate that can be
attributed to the

magnitude of the estimate. This observation is corroborated by the results of
The magnitude of estimate explains neither the high bid nor the low bid at

regression analysis.

57c level of significance.

Figure 2

Ratios of High and

Low

Bids Relative to Estimate,

$K

1.60

1.40

-

1.20
1

.00

Ave = 0.84

0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20 1
0.00

100

«+

-+-

+-

1,000

10,000

100,000

Office Estimate,

One should be

1,000,000

$K

cautious in interpreting the meaning of the data on the bids, particularly in

attempting to predict future outcome. Section 5 examines the trends in the project.costs including
the construction cost since January 1997.
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CA/T Cost Forecast and Variances

5.

Monitoring

5.1.

Introduction

The CA/T monthly management report is an essential tool for monitoring the performance of the
Project. Each report provides a snapshot of the status of the project in time. This section of
describes a methodology of using the reports for continuous monitoring of the project cost.

Methodology

5.2

Project Cost

The

Summary

monthly reports provide the trends of the various project cost elements.
we have recorded the summary cost data
from the management reports. This provides a convenient way of examining and comparing the
individual panels (Table 3-1) in a single spreadsheet. Also included on this sheet are the
summary data on design and construction costs for the four major cost components (i.e., tunnel,
1-90, 1-93, and system- wide) of the CA/T Project. These costs are then summarized in Table 5-1
for those months for which we had the monthly reports. In Table 5-1, the project direct cost
excludes air rights and the project support cost includes Third Party Costs.

To

financial data in the

track the history of budget changes and forecast,

Table 5-1 Monthly

Summary Costs

Direct Costs,

$M

Support Costs,

Apr-96
Jun-96

!

Sep-96
Jan-97
Feb-97
Mar-97

Direct + Support Cost,

$M

Current

Potential

Cost-to-

Current

Current

Potential

Cost-to-

Current

Current

Potential

Cost-to-

Budget

Budget

Forecast

date

Budget

Budget

Forecast

date

Budget

Budget

Forecast

date

(Unescal
ated)

(Escalate
d)

(Unescal
ated)

(Escalate
d)

(Unescal
ated)

(Escalate
d)

Support Cost

Direct Cost

Mar-96

$M

Current

8253
8253
8254
8254
8253
8318
8318

9302
9300

9146
9205
9384

9301

9441

9301

9510
9716
9788

9301

9377
9619

Direct + Support

3332

1426

1607

1527

4951

1424
1437

1605

1516
1495

1451

1461

1505

1637
1690

1445
1247

1619
1384

1384

5081

5193
6299
6655
7022

1621

1456
1324

386
402
406
587
637
639
675

9679
9677

10908
10907

10673

9691

10921

10879

9705
9758
9763
9565

10938

10902

10991

10966

10996
11003

11100
11112

10721
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3718
5353
5487
5780
6936
7294
7697

One makes

ihe following observations

[be budget cost Oi $10.4 billion,
is

not

m

(he table.

the "nominal cost",

The September 1996 Finance Plan

tcenvio, die high being $6.0

was

11

from the one-year data

in

which was used

Table 5-1.

in the

Finance Plan of September 1996,

forecast "to-go" cost at $5.5 billion as a mid-range

"
Since the cost-to-date was $4.9 billion,' the total project cost (escalated)
mid-range estimate, or $10.9 billion, the high-end estimate. The CA/T Project

billion.

implicitly $10.4 billion, the

Office apparently uses the high-end estimate as the escalated budget in

its

monthly management

report.

The upward

trend of the "Current Budget, Unescalated" for the Direct Cost since September 1996 is not
explained There has not been any known change in the scope of the project over this one-year period. Since
ihe issuance Of the September 1996 Finance Plan, the inflation rate has been fairly stable. Thus, there is no

(b)

apparent cause for the change in the budget.

Also unexplained

(c)

is

the trend towards lower Support Cost budget

and the dramatically decreasing forecast

for

the Support Cost.

Figure 3 displays graphically these cost trends in Table 5-1 for the direct cost, support cost, and
total cost,

both the budgets and forecast, by month. There has been a clear rise in the Direct Cost

The decline

in

Support Cost

is

also very evident. This decline partly negates the unfavorable

trend in the Direct Cost.

Figure 3
CA/T Project Cost

12.000

T

4,000

3,500

11.500
Total Forecast
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Total=Diiect + Support
Total Budget
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3,000

11.000
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e

^s

2,500

10.500

o

Forecast
Direct Cost

%
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•Direct Cost
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2,000

i
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•
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Support Cost

Budget Escalated
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•Support Cost
Forecast
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Data from CA/T Monthly Management Reports.

13
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20

Month

Finance Plan. Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, September 1996, p
Ibid., piv.
Ibid,

p

vii.

vii.
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5.3 Design

and Construction: Forecast and Variance

Table 5-2 summarizes the design and construction forecast for those months where data are
available: June 1996, January through March 1997. The table includes also budgets for the

month June 1996,

the base month.

One

notes the rapid increase in the construction costs since

June 1996.
Table 5-2

Monthly Forecast of Design and Construction (Zosts
Budget
Jun-96

Rnal Design
Tunnel

Forecast

Jun-96

Sep-96

Jan-97

Feb-97

Mar-97

94.1

94.7

94.1

94.1

94.4

1-90

184.5

186.9

192.7

193.5

192.5

1-93

318.2

325

342.6

340.9

341.9

56.3

57.2

57.3

57.3

57.3

13.1

8

7.6

7.3

10

666.2

671.8

694.3

693.1

696.1

1107.2

1123.6

1126.3

1127.2

1127.4

1557.6

1738.5

1745.1

1703.2

3781.5

4174.8

578.9

3964.3
600.9

4087.3

systemwide

1583
3733.9
553.8

602.6

604.7

Total

6977.9

7041.6

7430

7562.2

7610.1

systemwide
Design reserve
Final Design

'

Construction
Tunnel
1-90
1-93

Misc.

Construction

Mgmt

Reserve

Total

28

28

27.8

27.8

27.8

7005.9

7069.6

7457.8

7590

7637.9

7741.4

8152.1

8283.1

8334

259.3

7931.4

Figure 6 shows the bar graphs of the variances,

i.e.,

the deviation of forecast from the budget, for

by segments; and
two groups of variances are derived from Table 5-2 and

the three groups of cost items: Design/construction/reserve; construction cost
project direct
the last group

and support costs. The first
is derived from data in Table

5-1.
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Figure 4

Cost Variance Summary: Forecast
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In the course

WtU
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it

was a
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